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I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has come under
intense scrutiny in recent months3 as the United States capital markets have
3. Shortly after the colossal collapse of Enron Corporation, Sen. Jon Corzine (D., New
Jersey) proclaimed that the SEC should do a better job policing the accounting firms. See
SEC Seeks Accounting Reform: Chairman Harvey Pitt Says Restoring Public Confidence
is Goal No. 1, CNN MONEY, Jan. 17, 2002, available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/01/17/
news/secpitt/ (accessed from homepage by searching for the terms "SEC Seeks Accounting
Reform" from the money.cnn.com homepage) (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) [hereinafter SEC
Seeks Accounting Reform]. The SEC has drawn sharp criticism from not only elected
officials, but also the general public. See Pat Owens, SEC 'Shenanigans,' USATODAY, June
24, 2002, at I 1A Letters ("I'm not amazed by the dancing the Securities and Exchange
Commission and its chairman Harvey Pitt are doing with their oversight of the stock market.
1306 [Vol. 48:1305
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vacillated wildly on the heels of the collapse ofU.S. corporate giants Enron
Corporation and WorldCom Inc. and big five accounting firm Arthur
Andersen LLP.4 Enron's board of directors and management have been
All of those CEOs who received million-dollar deals at the expense of their stockholders
have no fear of reprisal from our government."); see also infra note 9.
In response to various criticisms of the SEC's failure to police the accounting
profession, former SEC chairperson Harvey Pitt openly admitted the critical need for SEC
reform in stating "[tihis commission cannot and... will not [ ] tolerate a pattern of growing
restatements, audit failures, corporate failures and massive investor losses. Somehow we
have got to put a stop to the vicious cycle that has now been in evidence for far too many
years." Chairman Harvey L. Pitt (transcript Public Statement by SEC Chairman: Regulation
oftheAccounting Profession, Jan. 17,2002, available at http://www.sec.gov (accessed from
homepage by selecting Speeches and Public Statements from the News and Public
Statements list, and then selecting Speeches and Statements by the Chairman and
Commissioners and scrolling down to the link for the Jan. 27, 2002 speech) (last visited Feb.
10, 2003)). Pitt has openly admitted that:
[o]ver the last decade or so, this Country's vaunted system of disclosure, financial
reporting, corporate governance and accounting practices has shown serious signs
of failing to keep up with the needs of today's investors, our economy, and new
technology that makes rapid communications not only possible but essential. The
* latest example-a most tragic and unprecedented one-is the failure of Enron....
Our disclosure and financial reporting system is still the best in the world, but it
has long needed improvement. Its inadequacies are more visible after Enron's
failure, and the need for change cannot be ignored any longer. This is not a
problem that arose overnight.
Id.; see also infra note 9.
In October 2002, despite open admissions of SEC inadequacy by then SEC chairperson
Pitt, a U.S. Senate committee, following an exacting investigation, formally found that the
SEC "dropped the ball on Enron" and "failed to discover and prevent the massive accounting
failure at Enron Corp." See Panel: SEC Dropped the Ball on Enron, CNN MONEY, Oct. 7,
2002, available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/10/07/news/companies/enron-senate.ap/
index.htm (accessed from homepage by entering title into CNN/Money) (last visited Mar.
13, 2003) ("The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, which has investigated the role
of the [SEC] and industry watchdogs in [Enron's] stunning collapse since early summer, said
oversight must be tighter. It said the failures could be pinned on financial analysts, credit
rating agencies and auditors, as well as the SEC.").
4. See Justin Lahart, The Crash of 2002, CNN MONEY, July 19, 2002, available at
http://money.cnn.com (accessed from homepage by entering the search terms "Crash of
2002" into the CNN/money search engine) (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) ("Ten trading days,
1,360 points off the Dow. Let's start calling the 'sell off' what it is. Let's call it a panic.
Let's call it a crash. Indeed, after rallying following Sept. 11, the markets topped out in
March [2002], and have been careening downward ever since."); see also Market Update:
A Modest Recovery, MONEYWHYS (The Vanguard Group, Inc., Valley Forge, P.A.), Spring
2002, at 5. The Vanguard Group, in a quarterly newsletter to its investors, details the recent
"volatile" and "unsettling" market swings brought about through "concern about the
integrity of corporate financial statements in the wake of the Enron accounting scandal." Id.
at 2, 5; see also Jake Ulick, Stocks: Can It Get Worse?, CNN MONEY, June 8, 2002,
1308 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1305
criminally charged and vilified5 and the energy giant has, for all intents and
available at http://money.cnn.com/2OO2/O6/O7/markets/sun-lookahead/index.htm (accessed
from homepage by entering title in CNN/Money search engine) (last visited Feb. 10, 2003)
(theorizing that market volatility will continue into the foreseeable future as "major indexes
continue to see short, violent surges amid long term declines"); Adam Shell, Stocks Continue
to Sink, With No Bottom in Sight, USA TODAY, June 24,2002, at I B ("[A]nxiety is running
high on Wall Street. Cries of'Where's the bottom?' and 'How low is low?' have resurfaced.
• . . Confidence has been rocked by steadily falling stock prices and highly publicized
scandals that have 'outed' crooked accounting firms, greedy CEOs and biased equity
analysts.").
Former SEC Chairperson, Harold Williams, responding to a request for reform
recommendations from the Senate Banking Committee, stated "that recent events have
resulted in a crisis of confidence unlike any [he has] experienced in over 50 years." Former
SEC Chairmen Offer Views on Problems Raised by Enron's Collapse, SEC TODAY (CCH
Washington Service Bureau), Feb. 21, 2002, at I (emphasis added); see also Robert J.
Samuelson, Optimists-Or Just Dreamers?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 14, 2002, at 39. "So many
unfamiliar forces are now tugging at the economy that a coherent outlook is hard, maybe
impossible. No one truly knows what will happen-especially, how long it will take
consumers and businesses to recover ..... Id.
As fraudulent accounting practice admissions mount, and as corporations collapse
under the weight of their own deceptions, the U.S. capital markets are held hostage, waiting
for the next enormous collapse. See David Saito-Chung & Jonah Keri, Stocks Undercut Lows
on WorldCom Worries, But Recover at Close, INv. BUS. DAILY, June 27, 2002, at Al
("WorldCom's admission of financial wrongdoing rocked the stock market Wednesday [June
26, 2002] and left investors wondering how and when the epidemic of sickly accounting will
be cured."). See generally Joseph Nocera, System Failure: Corporate America, We Have a
Crisis, FORTUNE, June 24, 2002, at 62.
5. See Louisa Beltran, Lay Signed Off On Deal: Former Enron CEO Stays Silent at
Hearing, Document Appears to Tie Him to LIM2, CNN MONEY, Feb. 12, 2002, available
at http://money.cnn.com/2002/02/l 2/news/enron lay/index.htm (accessed from homepage
by entering "Lay Signed Offon Deal" into the CNN/money search engine) (last visited Feb.
10, 2003) (stating that former Enron Corp. Chairman and CEO Kenneth "Lay... sat through
90 minutes of attacks from congressional investigators ... before he declined to testify"
before a Senate panel probing the collapse of the former energy trader). Kenneth Lay, who
had been considered as a possible Energy Secretary for the Bush administration, invoked his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when he refused to testify before the
Senate Commerce Committee. Id. Enormous criticism has been levied against the
management and board of directors of Enron as evidence surfaced linking Enron leadership
to various accounting smoking guns. See Enron Board A ware of Moves, CNN MONEY, Jan.
31,2002, available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/01/31/news/enronboard (accessed from
homepage by entering "Enron Board Aware of Moves" in the CNN/money search engine)
(last visited Feb. 10, 2003) ("Enron board members received detailed information about the
controversial partnerships that the collapsed energy trader used to inflate profits and hide
debt as early as four years ago, according to a newspaper article [Washington Post] ... that
cites minutes from four board meetings."). These smoking guns eventually exposed stunning
depths of corporate officer fraud leading to high profile arrests and indictments of former
Enron officers Andrew Fastow (chief financial officer) and Michael Kopper (assistant chief
financial officer). See Enron Ex-CFO Indicted: Andrew Fastow Hit With 78-Count
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
purposes, collapsed;6 Arthur Andersen, Enron's accountant, has been
criminally charged, convicted and ruined;7 and WorldCom has had fraud charges
Indictment for Role in Enron's Implosion, CNN MONEY, Nov. 1, 2002, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2002/l0/31/news/companies/enron/index.htm (accessed from
homepage by entering title into CNN/Money search engine) (last visited Mar. 13, 2003)
("Andrew Fastow, the former chief financial officer of bankrupt energy trader Enron, was
hit with a 78-count indictment... accusing him of deceiving investors by making the dying
company appear financially sound."); see also Going After Enron Exec's Assets, CNN
MONEY, Aug. 22, 2002, available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/08/22/news/companies/
enron/index.htm (accessed from homepage by entering "Kopper's Guilty Plea" into the
CNN/money search engine) (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) ("Justice Department officials say
the guilty plea ... by Michael Kopper, a former assistant to ex-Enron Financial Officer
Andrew Fastow, should allow them to go after $23 million from Fastow and other former
Enron Executives."). Former Enron Chief Executive Officers Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth
Lay also are under continuing investigation. See Enron Ex-CFO Indicted, supra; see also
infra note 314.
6. See generally Allan Sloan, Burned!: How Greedy Execs and Clueless Accountants
Left Enron Bankrupt and Little Guys in the Lurch, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 21,2002, at Cover, 14-
24 (detailing Enron's collapse and identifying the individuals involved in the fraud). See
also infra note 17.
7. U.S. v. Arthur Anderson, No. 2018, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 91, 719 (Mar. 20,
2002). The Federal Securities Law Reports reports, "[a] federal grand jury indicted [Arthur
Andersen LLP] for obstruction of justice. The indictment [filed in S.D. Tex.] charged the
firm with withholding and destroying evidence in [the] financial fraud investigation
[involving Enron Corp.]" Id. "In response to the indictment, the SEC announced several
regulatory measures designed to 'assure a continuing and orderly flow of information to
investors and U.S. capital markets and to minimize any potential disruptions"' because of
the indictment of Arthur Andersen. SEC Responds to Andersen Indictment, No. 2017, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I (Mar. 20, 2002). In the wake of the indictment and subsequent
criminal trial, Arthur Andersen has, for all intents and purposes, imploded. See Andrew
Countryman & Delroy Alexander, Bailing Out: Former Giant Written Off as Viable Player,
CI. TRiB., June 2, 2002, at 5-1. The Chicago Tribune continues:
As Chicago-based Andersen fights for its corporate life in a Houston courtroom,
the accounting giant has been hemorrhaging clients at a breathtaking rate,
reinforcing serious questions about what, if anything, will be left to carry on, even
if it wins its legal battle. Since the scandal surrounding Enron Corp. exploded and
Andersen was indicted on a federal obstruction-of-justice charge, auditing clients
have been leaving in droves-nearly 600 in the past three months alone.
Id.; see also Paul R. La Monica, Andersen's Fate Already Sealed: Regardless of the
Outcome of the Criminal Trial, the Accounting Firm's Future Looks Bleak, CNN MONEY,
June 6, 2002, available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/06/06/news/andersenfuture/index
.htm (accessed from homepage by entering title in CNN/Money search engine) (last visited
Mar. 13, 2003) ("The jury in the Arthur Andersen obstruction of justice trial began
deliberations on Thursday morning [June 6,2002] in Houston. And regardless of the verdict,
followers of the accounting industry held little hope that the beleaguered firm will survive
for much longer."). Finally, on June 15, 2002, the Houston jury found Andersen guilty of
obstruction ofjustice, "effectively end[ing]" the former accounting giant. See E.A. Torriero
& Robert Manor, Jury Finds Andersen Guilty: Auditor Convicted of Obstructing US.
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levied against it by the SEC and faces a grueling bankruptcy,' and at the
same time the SEC has similarly come under severe criticism. The harsh
Investigation of Enron Failure, CHI. TRIB., June 16, 2002, at 1-1 ("In an inglorious end to
its 89-year history as the country's pre-eminent accounting firm, Chicago-based Andersen
was convicted Saturday of obstruction ofjustice for interfering with a federal investigation
of its failed client, Enron Corp.").
However, Arthur Andersen will likely not be alone now in shouldering accounting firm
blame for the astonishing corporate failures of the past two years. Other "big five"
firms-K.P.M.G., Deloitte & Touche and Ernst & Young-now face serious allegations of
misconduct and possible civil action filed against them by state regulators and the SEC. See
KPMG May Face SEC Charges, CNN MONEY, Jan. 22, 2003, available at
http://money.cnn.con/2003/01/22/news/kpmgsec/index.htm (accessed from homepage by
entering title in CNN/Money search engine) (last visited Mar. 13, 2003) ("KPMG LLP said
Wednesday that the (SEC] may file a complaint against the accounting firm in federal district
court over its audits of Xerox Corp."); see also Joseph B. Treaster, Regulators Sue Deloitte
& Touche, CNN MONEY, Oct. 17,2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/102117/
business/17INSU.html (accessed from homepage by entering title in CNN/Money search
engine) (last visited Feb. 20, 2003) ("In a civil suit filed in state court... Pennsylvania's
Insurance Department accused Deloitte & Touche... of inflating the insurer's financial
statements by $ I billion and filing misleading reports as Reliance's executives were draining
cash from the troubled insurer."); see also SECEyes Ernst & YoungAuditors, CNN MONEY,
Oct. 31, 2002, available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/I 0/31/news/companies/index.htm
(accessed from homepage by entering title in CNN/Money search engine) (last visited Mar.
13, 2003) ("Stock market regulators are considering filing civil charges against three
accountants at Ernst & Young who audited CUC International, the accounting scandal-tarred
firm that preceded real estate and hotel company Cendant Corp.").
8. Tammy Williamson & Francine Knowles, Faith In Corporate America Crumbles:
Bush Comes Out Firing: SEC Files Fraud Charges, Clu. SUN-TIMES, June 27, 2002, at 7.
("As investors around the world choked on the news that long-distance giant WorldCom,
Inc. improperly hid losses of $3.8 billion and could go bankrupt, President Bush called its
accounting practices 'outrageous."'). Further, then-SEC chairperson Harvey Pitt announced,
"the agency had filed fraud charges against WorldCom in federal district court in New
York." Id. After revelations of accounting fraud surfaced, WorldCom CFO Scott Sullivan
was summarily dismissed. Scandal, Inc.: Wrong Numbers at WorldCom, CH1. SuN-TIMES,
June 27, 2002, at I ("Fired: CFO Scott Sullivan for hiding expenses."); see also infra notes
9,10,314.
In an eerily familiar scene, reminiscent ofEnron's congressional hearings, WorldCom's
senior management, when called to testify before the House Financial Services Committee
to account for management action or inaction in light of the company's collapse, refused to
testify. WorldCom Execs Stay Mum. A House Panel Begins WorldCom Hearings, CNN
MONEY, July 8, 2002, available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/07/08/news/companies/
worldconindex.htm (accessed from homepage by entering title on the CNN/Money search
engine) (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) ("Two former executives who led WorldCom when it
overstated profits declined to testify Monday [July 8, 2002] before federal lawmakers
angered by Corporate America's widening accounting scandals."). WorldCom management
silence "outraged" members of the House Committee trying to get to the bottom of the
scandal that bankrupted the nation's number-two long distance telephone provider. See id.;
see also infra note 10.
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criticisms lodged against the SEC malign the government agency for its
failure to appropriately monitor the accounting profession,9 detect
particular reporting illegalities or irregularities in various collapsing public
companies,'° and ultimately for its failure to honor its charge to protect the
9. See supra note 3. Senator Tom Daschle (D., South Dakota) upon learning of the
enormous fraudulent financial misstatements of WorldCom Inc., publicly blasted then SEC
chairperson Harvey Pitt and the SEC for failure to monitor, discover fraud and appropriately
punish corporate wrongdoers. MSNBC Live (MSNBC television broadcast, June 26, 2002);
see also Tom Hamburger et al., WorldCom Scandal Spurs Congress, WALL ST. J., June 27,
2002, at A8 ("Sen. Daschle directly criticized Mr. Pitt yesterday as 'not doing the job."').
Criticism of both Harvey Pitt and the failures of the SEC have been bipartisan in nature, as
both Republicans and Democrats blasted President Bush's former SEC director. See
President to Take Wall Street to Task (July 9, 2002), available at http://www.cnn.com/
2002/ALLPOLITICS/07/08/bush.corporate.abuse/index.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2003)
("Members of both parties have singled out SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt, a former securities
industry lawyer whose clients once included the now embattled accounting firm Arthur
Andersen. The White House has vigorously defended him, claiming Pitt has done a 'great
job,' but some lawmakers disagree."). One prominent Republican Senate leader called upon
then-Chairperson Pitt to resign his position as SEC head, in order to take a step toward
regaining investor confidence in U.S. corporate practice. John McCain, The Free Market
Needs New Rules, N.Y. TiMEs, July 8,2002, at Al 9 ("Congress and the president must move
quickly to frame legislation and reform corporate governance and government oversight.
And I would add one more suggestion: they should ask for the resignation of Harvey Pitt. ...
While Mr. Pitt may be a fine man, he has appeared slow and tepid in addressing accounting
abuses, and concerns remain that he has not distanced himself enough from former clients.").
But see SEC's Pitt Lashes Out at Critics, CNN MONEY, July 16, 2002, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2002/07/15/news/pitt/index.htm (accessed from homepage by entering
title into CNN/Money search engine) (last visited Feb. 9, 2003) ("[SEC] Chairman Harvey
Pitt lashed out at his detractors Monday [July 15, 2002], suggesting their calls for his
resignation are politically motivated.").
Finally, succumbing to unrelenting criticism, embattled SEC Chairperson Harvey Pitt
announced his resignation on November 5, 2002. SEC Chairman Pitt Resigns: Embattled
Chairman Resigns, Faced Criticism Throughout Tenure (Nov. 5, 2002), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/dailynews/pitt021105.htrl (accessed from homepage by
entering title in search engine) (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) ("Pitt, who first worked at the
SEC in the late 1960s and built his career as an attorney in ... Washington, has been
criticized for meeting with the heads of companies under SEC investigation ... ").
10. See supra notes 4,8; see also David Greising, Enough Already: Reform Now, From
the Top, CI. TRI., June 9, 2002, at 5-1 (detailing the recent surge in corporate scandal
resulting in related stock drops). In reporting on the recent accounting misrepresentations
of such companies as Kmart, Abbot Laboratories, Cendant Corp., and General Electric,
among others, Greising writes that:
There was a time when all it took to follow business was a good eye for strategy
and a good head for numbers. Now we need a good nose for a scandal and a strong
stomach for indigestion.... By some estimates, investors have lost $4 trillion in
market value in scandal-related stock drops.
Id. (emphasis added).
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United States investing public and secure the integrity of the U.S. capital
markets."
Further, Tyco International's stock plunged 81% in 2002 alone, costing investors $95
billion amid investor panic about its accounting practices, management credibility and $24
billion in debt. Alex Berenson, Tyco Turmoil Deepens as It Fires Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, June
11, 2002, at C 1. Investor panic turned out to be justifiable as three top Tyco executives were
eventually charged and indicted for "loot[ing]" the company of over $600 million. Kozlowski
Hit with More Charges, CNN MONEY, Sept. 12, 2002, available at http://money
.cnn.com/2002/09/! 2/news/companies/kozlowski/index.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003); see
also infra note 314.
Further, the former chairperson and two former senior executives of Rite Aid
Corporation were recently indicted "in what authorities described as a far-reaching securities
and accounting fraud that prompted the largest restatement of corporate earnings in
American history." Former Rite Aid Executives Charged With Defrauding Investors, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/business/ap-rite-
aid.html ("'The charges announced today reveal a disturbing picture of dishonesty and
misconduct at the highest level of a major corporation,' said Wayne M. Carlin, northeast
regional director of the SEC. 'Rite Aid's former senior management employed an extensive
bag of tricks to manipulate the company's reported earnings and defraud its investors."').
Further, with what has been modestly deemed "creative accounting," WorldCom Inc.
duped investors for over fifteen months claiming large profit margins when in fact the
company was losing money steadily. Jared Sandberg, Sorry, Wrong Number: Inside
WorldCom's Unearthing of a Vast Accounting Scandal, WALL ST. J., June 27,2002, at Al
(detailing the unorthodox hiding of expenses as capital expenditures by WorldCom's Chief
Financial Officer, Scott Sullivan, in effect misstating over $3.8 billion of expenses that were
improperly booked and must now be restated); see also supra note 8. In fact, such corporate
malfeasance had many commentators correctly predicting that WorldCom would file for
bankruptcy, making it the largest corporate failing of its kind, leading to serious problems
for the "nation's long-distance phone industry." Reinhardt Krause, WorldCom Collapse is
Likely to Force a Rethinking of U.S. Telecom Policies, Others to Feel Squeeze, Too, INV.
BUS. DAILY, June 27, 2002, at Al ("The No. 2 long-distance firm, WorldCom is near
bankruptcy. It disclosed a multibillion-dollar accounting fraud... sending shock waves
through an already sick industry."); see also Simon Rivero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom Files
for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,2002, at Al (detailing WorldCom's
Chapter II bankruptcy filing); see also infra note 314.
Further, the deluge of corporate accounting misrepresentation includes enormous
overstated earnings by Xerox Corp., wherein Xerox settled fraud charges with the SEC by
agreeing to restate five years of revenue and pay a $10 million fine, "the largest ever
involving alleged financial reporting fraud." Kathleen Day, Xerox Restates 5 Years of
Revenue: '97-'01 Figures Were Off by $6.4 Billion, WASH. POST, June 29, 2002, at Al
("Xerox Corp. announced yesterday [June 28, 2002] that accounting errors forced it to
restate $6.4 billion in revenue for the past five years, more than twice the $3 billion
anticipated ... ").
11. See The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors and Maintains
Market Integrity (December 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtnl
(last visited Feb. 8, 2003) ("The primary mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) is to protect investors and maintain the integrity of the securities
markets. As more and more first-time investors turn to the markets to help secure their
[Vol. 48:13051312
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At this volatile economic time and at a time when consumer and investor
confidence is severely shaken, 2 former SEC chairperson Harvey L. Pitt
futures,... these goals are more compelling than ever."). The SEC, on its website, declares
that its primary responsibility is to protect those that invest in the United States capital
markets. Id. The SEC describes its conceptual mandate as follows:
The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United States derive
from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors whether large institutions
or private individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an
investment prior to buying it. To achieve this, the SEC requires public companies
to disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public, which
provides a common pool of knowledge for all investors to use to judge for
themselves if a company's securities are a good investment. Only through the
steady flow of timely, comprehensive and accurate information can people make
sound investment decisions.
Id. Following the dual collapse of Enron and Arthur Andersen, and acknowledging the
criticism and need for reform, the SEC has begun to take steps to address the issues and
problems that allowed Enron's ultimate failure. Pitt Says SEC Plans to Respond Swiftly to
Recent Crises, SEC TODAY (CCH Washington Service Bureau), Feb. 25, 2002, at I ("The
SEC cannot wait for Congressional action, which could take too long, so the Commission
is proceeding with an ambitious program of rulemaking and an overhaul of its present
system.... Every profession needs diligent and vigorous oversight and quality control and
accountants are no exception. Pitt said a regulatory system for accountants should have been
put in place years ago and the SEC intends to put one in place as soon as possible."); see
also Former SEC Chairmen Offer Views On Problems Raised by Enron 's Collapse, supra
note 4, at I ("Five former SEC chairmen last week offered their views on accounting and
investor protection issues that have arisen in the aftermath of Enron Corp.'s collapse. The
chairmen outlined a number of recommendations for reform in written statements submitted
to the Senate Banking Committee.").
Despite pledges of reform, the SEC continues to be starkly criticized for its breakdowns
in the wake of "stunning corporate failures that exposed the severe regulatory shortcomings"
of the agency once considered "one of the brightest stars in the constellation of federal
regulatory agencies." Stephen Labaton, In Stormy Time, S.E.C. Is Facing Deeper Trouble,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002, at Al[hereinafter Labaton, S.E.C. Is Facing Deeper Trouble]
("The Securities and Exchange Commission, still reeling from the recent resignation of
its chairman, Harvey L. Pitt, and other top officials, is plagued by problems that go deeper
than its leadership difficulties and have undermined its ability to police companies and
markets ... ").
Additional censure of the SEC and former chairperson Pitt has come from the General
Accounting Office (an investigative arm of Congress) who, following an investigation into
the SEC's efforts to organize and seat an accounting oversight board, determined that the
SEC under Pitt has been an "agency in chaos." Stephen Labaton, Government Report Details
a Chaotic S.E.C. Under Pitt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2002/12/20/business/20PITT.html ("The Securities and Exchange Commission under
Harvey L. Pitt was described today as dysfunctional by a government report examining the
agency's selection of a new accounting oversight board." (emphasis added)).
12. See supra notes 3, 4. In a rare public appearance, and in an even rarer admission,
Henry M. Paulson, Jr., the chairman and chief executive of Goldman Sachs admitted that
"faith in corporate executives was at a low and was forestalling a recovery in financial
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openly acknowledged the weaknesses of the SEC and the need for
immediate reforms within his agency, particularly with regard to
monitoring and regulating the accounting profession. 3 Former chairman
Pitt has stated decisively that "restoring public confidence" is one of the
SEC's most urgent priorities. 4 Meanwhile, others have pointedly brought
to light the "regulatory black hole[s]' 5 that currently exist within the
securities laws, which basically allow public companies to "shield volatile
assets from quarterly financial reporting and to artificially inflate the[ir]
value.""6 One such identifiable regulatory black hole essentially facilitated
the Enron debacle, as carefully orchestrated by its management.' 7
markets." Patrick McGeehan, Goldman Chief Urges Reforms in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 2002, at Al. Paulson continued by tracing the financial market crisis back to the
collapse of the Enron Corporation last fall, and saying "I cannot think of a time when
business over all has been held in less repute."Id.
13. See supra notes 3, 11.
14. See SEC Seeks Accounting Reform, supra note 3.
15. Enron's Use of Derivatives Examined, in 4 CORPORATE SECRETARY'S GUIDE 52
(CCH Apr. 9, 2002) (reporting that the fall of Enron involved derivatives trading where
Enron was compared to an OTC (over the counter) derivatives trading firm operating within
a "regulatory black hole"). Testifying before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee,
University of San Diego law professor Frank Partnoy testified that it "appears that some
Enron employees systematically used 'dummy accounts' and 'rigged valuation
methodologies' to create false profit and loss entries for the derivatives Enron traded." Id.
Professor Partnoy continued by noting "that the OTC derivatives markets are largely
unregulated and Enron's trading operations were not regulated, or even recently audited, by
securities regulators." Id. Professor Partnoy also described Enron's complex use of this
regulatory black hole as follows:
Specifically, Enron used derivatives and special purpose vehicles to
manipulate its financial statements in three ways. First, it hid losses it suffered on
technology stocks. Second, it hid huge debts incurred to finance unprofitable new
businesses, including retail energy services for new customers. Third, it inflated
the value of other troubled businesses, including its new ventures in fiber-optic
bandwidth.
With regard to hiding losses, a critical piece of the puzzle, the element that
made it all work, was a derivative transaction called a price swap derivative
between Enron and a special purpose entity, or SPE.
Id. Enron's management was able to deftly hide massive losses from investors and
shareholders using complex partnership structures, thereby artificially inflating company
value. Id.
16. Id.
17. See generally supra notes 5, 6. The massive failure of the Enron Corporation may
very well represent an unparalleled corporate collapse in United States history. As recent
commentators noted:
It seems hard to believe now, but Enron (ENE) used to be the envy of corporate
America. In less than a decade, the Houston company transformed itself from
stodgy gas-pipeline operation to natural gas and electricity trading powerhouse.
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Dazzled by sizzling earning growth, giddy investors bid up Enron's shares 312%
in two years to a high of $90.75 in 2000. Then someone turned out the lights.
Beset by marketplace woes and management mishaps, the stock already had
tumbled 53% when chiefexecutive Jeffrey Skilling stunned investors by resigning
last August. After that, the bad news came at hyperspeed: $1.2 billion in
shareholder equity zapped by risky hedging deals, a Securities and Exchange
Commission probe, a last-chance merger with rival Dynegy called off and, finally,
a bankruptcy filing. By the end of November [2001], the stock had plummeted to
26 [cents], obliterating $67 billion in market cap-a shocking fall for a company
that just last year occupied the No. 7 spot on the Fortune 500.
Lisa Gibbs et al., Enron: The Lessons for Investors, MONEY, Jan. 2002, at 30. Despite the
collapse and mounting evidence to the contrary, various board members and management
figures continually denied knowledge of the impending doom awaiting Enron. Id. at 30-31
("When pushed to reveal more, management was often tight lipped and unprofessional.
During one famous conference call last April [2001], [CEO] Skilling called an analyst an
'asshole' for complaining about the company's failure to provide a balance sheet with its
earnings announcement.").
A U.S. Senate report belied Enron management's professed ignorance to circumstances
leading up to the Enron collapse; specifically, it found that the Enron board of directors
clearly knew of Enron's "high-risk accounting and off-the-books deceptions." Carrie
Johnson, Senate Report Criticizes Enron Board in Collapse, CHm.TRmB., July 7, 2002, at 1-11
("The members of Enron Corp.'s board of directors contributed to the company's collapse
by failing to curb the Houston energy trader's risky accounting tactics, approving conflicts
of interest, and rubber-stamping enormous cash payouts to executives, according to a harshly
worded Senate report to be released Sunday."). The Senate report determined that "[t]he
board witnessed numerous indications ofquestionable practices by Enron management over
several years, but chose to ignore them to the detriment of Enron shareholders, employees
and business associates." Id.
Further belying Enron management's professed ignorance to looming ills are reports
identifying various Enron executives taking enormous cash bonuses and selling chunks of
Enron stock immediately prior to the company's collapse. David Barboza, Before Enron 's
Collapse, A Windfall For Officials, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2002, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2002/06/18/business/I 8enro.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2003). Records indicate
that:
In the year before the Enron Corporation collapsed last December, about 100
executives and energy traders collected more than $300 million in cash payments
from the company, according to documents filed today [June 18, 2002] in
bankruptcy court.
More than $100 million... went to Kenneth L. Lay, the company's former
chairman and chief executive.
A majority of the cash payments went to employees of units whose
profitability has been called into question since the company's collapse....
The disclosure of scores of large cash payments is certain to increase the ire
offormer lower-level employees who have long complained about how high-level
executives sold more than $1 billion in Enron shares in the year before the
company filed for bankruptcy protection.
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The SEC has pledged to address such regulatory problems as it seeks
to reform its decades old system of periodic disclosure and financial
reporting.' 8 Ultimately, much needed reform will necessarily fall on the
shoulders of the SEC as Congress struggles to address corporate
malfeasance through legislation. 9 In this atmosphere of shaken public
confidence and congressional bickering amid cautious congressional
revision,20 the SEC is now under intense pressure to move forward quickly
Yet even as the company was hurtling toward bankruptcy, some . . .
executives were showered with huge retention bonuses worth nearly $100 million.
Id.
18. See Pitt, supra note 3 ("Our system of periodic disclosure.., is old and not good
enough. Today, disclosures are made not to inform, but to avoid liability. We need to move
to a system of 'current' disclosure. The present system, which has been in effect for 67 years,
doesn't provide for 'current disclosure.' Financial disclosures are dense, impenetrable.").
19. See Stephen Labaton & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enthusiasm Ebbs for Tough Reform
in Wake of Enron, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2002, at AI ("Six months after the collapse of
Enron, a wave of enthusiasm for overhauling the nation's corporate and accounting laws has
ebbed and the toughest proposals for change are all but dead."). The New York Times
reported that a powerful group of lobbyists, using partisan disagreements in Congress as its
tool, appears to have killed congressional efforts to "impose tight new controls on corporate
conduct." Id. ("Bills imposing more stringent accounting standards, changing the tax and
accounting treatment of employee stock options and setting tougher conflict-of-interest rules
for stock analysts and accounting firms have all fallen victim to political gridlock."). But see
Hamburger et al., supra note 9 (indicating that Congress may be spurred to action based on
the WorldCom scandal, after the reform furor had died down over Enron). "The giant
WorldCom accounting scandal is giving a powerful boost of energy to the drive in Congress
to clean up business practices, accelerating legislation reining in the accounting industry and
shooting new life into a range of other corporate-reform proposals." Id.
In the midst of market chaos, some on Wall Street are trying to persuade Congress to
eviscerate certain state power over securities regulation. Gretchen Morgenson, A Wall St.
Push to Water Down Securities Laws, N.Y. TIMEs, June 18, 2002, available at http://
www.nytimes.com (accessed from homepage by selecting Search and entering "Gretchen
Morgenson and Securities Regulation") (last visited Feb. 11,2003). ("Some members of the
securities industry are pushing Congress to prevent states from pursuing those who violate
securities laws, including Wall Street firms now under investigation for conflicts of interest
by their stock analysts.... [Tihe draft of the amendment ... would block the states' current
investigation of stock analysts and would severely restrict their enforcement of securities
laws in the future .... ).
20. See David E. Sanger & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Senate Unanimously Passes
Corporate Reform Measure, N.Y. TIMEs, July 16, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2002/07/16 business/I6SENA.html (last visited Feb. 11,2003) ("The Senate tonight
[July 15, 2002] unanimously passed a broad overhaul of corporate fraud, accounting and
securities laws to curb the abuses that have rocked Wall Street, and President Bush strongly
hinted that he was inclined to sign almost any bill that emerged from negotiations by the
Senate and the House."). The "Sarbanes Bill," that was "passed by the Senate tonight would
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with its pledged reforms.2
One reason why the SEC must move forward with its pledged overhaul
is because the agency is notorious for its refusal to clearly articulate the
rules it establishes or the doctrines it promulgates.2 2 Because the SEC has
historically been secretive and still chooses to shroud itself and its rules in
mystery and ambiguity, the investing public is often skeptical as to the
intentions and directions of the agency.23 Of further consequence, beyond
create a new regulatory board with investigative and enforcement powers to oversee the
accounting industry, limit the amount of consulting work auditors can perform and prohibit
Wall Street investment firms from punishing honest research analysts whose reports anger
clients of the firm." Id. Despite these measures, it is unclear what kind of bill will emerge
once the House of Representatives and the Senate negotiates legislation that can be
forwarded to the President for signature as various lawmakers already indicate that this bill
may go to far. See id.; see also Avoiding Future Enrons and WorldComs, WALL ST. J., July
10, 2002, at Al (detailing the various corporate reform actions being considered by the U.S.
Congress including overseeing accountants, punishing wayward CEOs, increasing CEO
responsibility, restricting stock options, funding the SEC, improving financial disclosure and
protecting pensions); see generally Jim Drinkard, Sweeping Corporate Overhaul OK 'd 97-0,
USA TODAY, July 16, 2002, at IA (reporting that corporate reform bill, while nearly dead
three weeks earlier, was revived and passed due to further corporate scandal, particularly
WorldCom, and the volatility of the capital markets). "'It's not an exaggeration to say the
crisis in our markets has put the plans and hopes and dreams of millions of Americans at
risk,' said Senate banking committee Chairman Paul Sarbanes, D-Md. The bill is 'an
essential step toward restoring confidence."' Id.; see also discussion infra note 59. In depth
analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the proposed reforms therein is beyond the scope of
this article.
21. Seesupra notes 3, 11.
22. See infra notes 54,55,276,277 and accompanying text. Admittedly, the SEC must,
at times, believe that vagueness and ambiguity in its rules allows it a certain flexibility in
applying its standards. In a fast paced economy, where technological breakthroughs astonish
at times, perhaps the SEC believes that introducing no clear guidelines or standards allows
it to be mobile in addressing unforeseen issues thereby protecting its ability to patrol novel
transactions.
23. See id.; see also Owens, supra note 3; Mitch Glaser, Voice of the People,
Corporate Truth, Cmi. TRiB., July 28, 2002, at 2-8 ("Financial analysts claiming that false
balance sheets are the exception goes in one ear and out the other. I want proof."). In
expressing dissatisfaction with the current corporate scandals and the SEC's failure to
protect investors physician Glaser writes:
Rumors are out there, which I think are true, that fake balance sheets have become
standard and are not limited to Andersen-audited business. Until we investors
know about all the past accounting trickery, and that now things have changed, we
are going to stay out of the markets. Neither Congress passing new laws nor the
president giving speeches will persuade me to buy stocks or corporate bonds.
Id.; see also Walter Goldberg, Voices of the People, Corporate Culprits, CH1. TRIB., July 28,
2002, at 2-8 ("With a sagging stock market, why aren't those corporate culprits who caused
the problems in jail where they belong? The American public is tired of listening to the
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investor distrust, is the reality that because the SEC creates confusion and
ambiguity in its rules and established doctrines, it must spend significant
agency resources in providing clarifications and guidelines for issuers and
practitioners.24
Through SEC official releases, SEC no-action letters and telephone
calls and interpretive telephonic communications, the agency spends
considerable amounts of time and resources explaining itself, clarifying its
doctrines and answering questions that could be dealt with far more
efficiently if it would initiate clear rules and simple defining terms when
a rule or doctrine is established. For its own sake, the SEC must begin to
provide coherent, specific guidelines to the markets, not only for the new
rules it promulgates, but also for the cumbersome doctrines and rules that
have existed for many years.2"
In light of the criminal manipulations of financial statements and the
purposeful deception of investors by numerous U.S. corporations, and
because of the SEC's admitted weak policing of corporate financial
statements,26 the issue must now be raised: How much more time would the
politicians (including our president) giving meaningless speeches on corporate
responsibilities while these scoundrels are enjoying the fruits of their thievery.").
24. See generally infra note 151 and accompanying text (describing the deluge of no-
action requests the SEC received from 1970 to 1979 where issuers sought integration
doctrine guidance).
25. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
26. See Klaus Eppler, Overview of SEC and Other Developments Affecting the
Preparation ofAnnual Disclosure Documents: Bases for the Public Company's Year-End
Disclosure Obligations, in I PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DIScLOsuRE DOCUMENTS 1I, 17
(Practising Law Institute 2002). Eppler announces:
[w]ith the decline in IPO filings and, generally, transactional filings... the Staff
of Division of Corporation Finance has indicated an intention to allocate greater
Staff resources to the review of '34 Act periodic filings.
1. For many years the aspirational goal... has been to review a public company's
filings at least once every three years ....
3. With almost 16,000 companies registered under the '34 Act and with a large
volume of IPO and other transactional filings, the Staff in 2000 reportedly
reviewed only a very small fraction of Form 10-Ks. The Staff has indicated that
it expects to review a much larger percentage of Form 10-Ks but still less than
one-third of the companies required to file them.
Id. at 17; see also Labaton, S.E. C. Is Facing Deeper Trouble, supra note I1. On December
1, 2002, the New York Times described the SEC as a federal agency in serious trouble based
on its inability to handle the corporate crises of the past two years because of its failure to
conduct the actual detailed examination of public filings of over 15,000 corporations each
year. Id. The SEC's
corporate finance division, which for years never examined in detail the filings of
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SEC have devoted to reviewing financial statements of public companies
were it not spending so much of its time clarifying and defining its own
guidelines and doctrines?
If the SEC is devoting valuable time and resources to responding,
clarifying and explaining its own rules, doctrines and intentions, then the
agency is not spending that particular time reviewing financial statements
or policing corporate disclosures. Nor is the SEC protecting investors from
unscrupulous corporate pirates, a list that now includes Enron, WorldCom,
Adelphia, Xerox, Rite Aid, Tyco International, Global Crossing, Nicor,
Merck, Johnson & Johnson, Sunbeam, ImClone and Qwest
Communications, amongst many others."
Now that cries for overhaul have been heard and acknowledged by the
agency and by Congress, a complete renovation must include a reordering
of priorities, focuses and resource allocation. The SEC must first address
the current "crisis of confidence"2 by responding to the torrent of false
corporate financial statements. In order to do so effectively, the SEC must
overhaul the inadequacies in its financial reporting system.29 Next, by
simply reforming some of its ambiguous rules and clarifying, by official
release, some of its confounding doctrines, the SEC could positively
reorder its focus and free an extensive amount of time for the more critical
functions of policing corporate America and protecting the U.S. investing
thousands of companies, including Enron, remains unable to analyze the majority
of the 15,000 filings by corporations each year. The division now focuses on the
nation's largest companies.
But in some cases, according to officials, reviewers have just one day to
examine as many as six corporate annual reports to see if they are problematic.
The secretarial staff is so small that many senior analysts spend huge amounts of
time simply photocopying documents.
Id. Noted securities expert and historian Joel Seligman maintains that other forces have
contributed to the collapse of the U.S. capital markets recently:
The two periods of greatest political controversy in the history of the Securities
and Exchange Commission were the initial years, when the statute to create the
commission and its full mandate were adopted, and the last period since the 1994
elections, when Newt Gingrich's Contract With America attempted as part of a
broad deregulatory effort to roll back the registration and enforcement
mechanisms of the commission.... We have seen a wild roller-coaster ride since
1994.
Id.
27. See supra notes 10, 15, 17; see also infra notes 56, 314, 324, 344.
28. Former SEC Chairmen Offer Views on Problems Raised by Enron 's Collapse,
supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing the corporate scandals rocking the U.S.
markets as the impetus for the current "crisis of confidence").
29. See generally infra note 59.
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public.
In this current overhaul atmosphere, where a furor has arisen to reform
the SEC and the securities laws, there exists an obscure but crucial
securities doctrine that must not be forgotten amidst the reform wave: that
one decades-old doctrine in immediate need of alteration attention from the
SEC is the securities "integration doctrine."30 Whereas, from its inception
in 1933 until today, the doctrine has been plagued by confusion, ambiguity
and indiscernible interpretation, 31 over the past quarter-century, a number
of securities scholars have written clearly and intelligently about this
integration problem.32 Most of those authors have brutally criticized the
doctrine and fervently petitioned the SEC to reform its approach to
integration doctrine analysis." The criticisms have become so strong that
30. Indeed, of those scholars who have written about the securities law integration
doctrine over the years, most have referred to the doctrine as problematic, including
reference to securities integration as "vexing and pointless," Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The
Overwhelming Case For Elimination of the Integration Doctrine Under the Securities Act
of1933,89 Ky. L.J. 289,289 (2000-200 1) [hereinafter Campbell, The Overwhelming Case],
"costly and confusing," C. Steven Bradford, Expanding the Non-Transactional Revolution:
A New Approach to Securities Registration Exemptions, 49 EMORY L.J. 437, 441 (2000)
[hereinafter Bradford, Expanding the Non-Transactional Revolution], and "immensely
difficult." Cheryl L. Wade, The Integration of Securities Offerings: A Proposed Formula
that Fosters the Policies of Securities Regulation, 25 LoY. U. CIt. L.J. 199,211 (1994). See
infra Part IV.A and accompanying text.
3 1. See Campbell, The Overwhelming Case, supra note 30, at 291, 303-04 n.46, 307-
10. Campbell argues compellingly that the ambiguities and uncertainties of the integration
doctrine are nothing short of exasperating and that "[e]ssentially, everyone concedes the
ambiguity in the common law criteria of integration and the difficulty of applying the
criteria." Id. at 310. Further, Campbell opines that the courts have misunderstood and
misinterpreted the integration doctrine. Id. at 303 n.46 ("For example, the court's treatment
of the integration issue in Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942), is essentially
unintelligible. The cases following Shaw, while broadly intelligible, are nonetheless
confusing and based on uncertain principles and fail to articulate with clarity the criteria of
integration." (emphasis added)).
32. See supra notes 1, 30; see also C. Steven Bradford, Regulation A and the
Integration Doctrine: The New Safe Harbor, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 255 (1994) [hereinafter
Bradford, The New Safe Harbor]; Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers
(And Others) Under Regulation D: Those Nagging Problems that Need Attention, 74 KY.
L.J. 127 (1985-86) [hereinafter Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers]; Darryl B. Deaktor,
Integration of Securities Offerings, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 465 (1979); Daniel J. Morrissey,
Integration of Securities Offerings-The ABA 's "Indiscreet "Proposal, 26 ARiz. L. REV. 41
(1984).
33. See supra notes 30-32; see also Bradford, Expanding the Non-Transactional
Revolution, supra note 30, at 471 nn.214-18 (listing modification suggestions that various
scholars and practitioners have posited over the years in hopes that adoption by the SEC
would address and ultimately eliminate the integration problem). Bradford writes that
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recent articles call upon the SEC to abolish the integration doctrine
altogether.34
Conceptually, the securities law integration doctrine was introduced to
protect the investing public from certain issuers that might improperly
avoid public disclosure by splintering security issuances into separate,
distinct exemptions not requiring registration"5 In order to legitimately
avoid registration as mandated by the Securities Act of 1933 (1933
Securities Act),36 an offering of securities must meet the requirements of a
single available exemption, as detailed in the 1933 Securities Act and other
SEC rules and regulations." If a 1933 Securities Act exemption is not
available to an issuer proposing to offer securities to the public, then that
offering must be registered with the SEC, thereby making crucial company
information available to the agency and the general public for close review
numerous scholars have suggested modification to the integration doctrine for many years.
"[A]uthors have suggested ... modifications to the integration doctrine. Some ... have
called for adoption of the ABA tests, sometimes with modifications. A few have proposed
temporal safe harbors shorter than six months. Others have proposed modifications to the
SEC's five-factor test for integration. Some have suggested multiple approaches." Id. at 471
(citations omitted).
34. See Campbell, The Overwhelming Case, supra note 30, at 294-95 ("The thesis of
this Article is that the Commission should entirely eliminate the integration doctrine from
the 1933 Act. The doctrine is expensive for society and furthers no valid policy of the 1933
Act. More specifically, the doctrine does not promote investor protection but does retard
capital formation, an outcome that is contrary to the presently articulated purposes of the
1933 Act.") (citations omitted).
35. See Wade, supra note 30, at 199. When discussing the original goal of protecting
investors, Wade notes:
Under certain circumstances, separate offerings, each of which would satisfy the
requirements of an exemption if considered separately, may be combined under
the SEC's "integration" theory. The combination of two or more offerings often
results in a single, integrated offering that does not qualify for an exemption when
considered as a whole. When the integrated offering fails to satisfy the
requirements of any of the 1933 Act's exemptions from registration, the issuer
faces serious consequences for offering unregistered securities in violation of
section 5 of the Act.
Id. at 200. The integration doctrine was originally announced by the Federal Trade
Commission in December 1933 wherein it held that an issuer could not sell part of an
offering using the intrastate offering exemption and then sell the rest of the issue in a
registered interstate offering. See Securities Act Release No. 97, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 1021-1029 (Dec. 28, 1933), available at 11 Fed. Reg. 10,949.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1994).
37. For examples of 1933 Securities Act exemptions, see the section 3(a)(9) exemption,
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1994), the section 3(a)(l 1) exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1 1) (1994)
and the section 4(2) exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(2) (1994).
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and scrutiny.38 To that end, an issuer may never use two or more
exemptions to avoid registration of what is really a single transaction.39 The
SEC created the integration doctrine in order to establish what constitutes
a single offering for purposes of registration.4"
If an issuer proposes to offer two securities issuances and is seeking to
permissibly avoid the registration of each offering by claiming exemptions
to the registration process, the SEC will test both offerings to determine
whether the issuances are really part of a single transaction as established
by the integration doctrine." If two sets of issuances are in fact "part of the
same transaction," they will be "'integrated' and treated as a single
offering, and the entire integrated offering must then qualify for a single
exemption," or it must be registered. 2 The integration doctrine is designed
to prevent issuers from improperly separating a single offering into two or
more parts and using a separate exemption for each part of the offering,
thereby avoiding registration of the single transaction."
Essentially then, the integration doctrine "is used to combine two or
more otherwise exempt securities sales into a single offering" that is not
qualified under any of the 1933 Securities "Act's available exemptions
from registration. The integration" concept may also be used to "integrate"
"an exempt sale with a registered sale, resulting in the" first sale "losing its
registration exemption."'
The historical battle that is at the heart of the integration problem
concerns investor protection (through registration) versus capital formation
(and the obstacles that restrict such formation).4 The integration doctrine
38. See Wade, supra note 30, at 199-200.
39. See Bradford, Expanding the Non-Transactional Revolution, supra note 30, at 460
(citing J. William Hicks, The Concept of Transaction as a Restraint on Resale Limitations,
49 Oio ST. L. J. 417,431 (1988)).
40. Id.
41. See Wade, supra note 30, at 209-10. Wade notes that:
To determine whether an issuer has artificially divided an offering to evade the
1933 Act's registration requirements, the SEC examines multiple, apparently
exempt offerings to determine whether those offerings actually constitute a single,
larger offering. If the SEC concludes that the offerings should be integrated, either
the combined offering, considered as a whole, must independently satisfy the
requirements of an exemption, or the issuer must register the offering.
Id. (citing Deaktor, supra note 32, at 492) (citations omitted).
42. Bradford, Expanding the Non-Transactional Revolution, supra note 30, at 460.
43.Id.
44. ABA Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., Integration of Securities Offerings: Report ofthe
Task Force on Integration, 41 Bus. LAW. 595, 595 (1986) [hereinafter Task Force].
45. See Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers, supra note 32, at 134 ("The
Commission, within the structure of Regulation D, apparently attempted to balance the need
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conceptually, was created to protect investors from unscrupulous securities
issuers." At the time the doctrine was initiated, investor protection was an
urgent priority of the U.S. government and the newly formed SEC.47 In
spite of positive intentions, the integration doctrine has, over the years,
unquestionably caused difficulty, particularly for small businesses who are
attempting to raise needed capital." Despite these duel concerns that must
be weighed, the integration doctrine's most exasperating component is its
imprecise, vague test and its incoherent application."9
In an environment ripe for securities law reform, the SEC should
genuinely consider, once and for all, ending the legacy of ambiguity,
confusion and exasperation that is the securities integration doctrine.
Indeed, one of the many ways that the SEC can begin to meet its stated goal
for investor protection with the need to provide cost efficient access to the capital markets.");
see also C. Steven Bradford, Transaction Exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933: An
Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 591,602-09 (1996) [hereinafter Bradford, An Economic
Analysis] (describing the various and often substantial costs associated with registering an
offering of securities with the SEC); Wade, supra note 30, at 200 (detailing the balancing
of protecting investors through registration against the facilitation of capital formation).
Wade explains that:
To prevent the hampering of commerce that results from unnecessary registration,
the 1933 Act provides a variety of exemptions from registration that relieve issuers
of the cost and delay of registration. These exemptions generally reflect a
balancing of the 1933 Act's goal of protecting investors through mandatory
registration with its goal of facilitating capital formation, particularly for small
issuers.
Id. Wade concludes that "[i]n pursuing the goal of facilitating commerce, the SEC has not
... abandoned its goal of investor protection." Id. at 207.
46. Integration of Abandoned Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33,7943 (Feb. 5,
2001), available at 17 C.F.R. 230.155 (2002). The SEC explained in its release announcing
new Rule 155:
The integration doctrine, which has existed since 1933, prevents an issuer from
improperly avoiding registration by artificially dividing a single offering so that
Securities Act exemptions appear to apply to the individual parts where none
would be available for the whole. Improper reliance on an exemption can harm
investors by depriving them of the benefits of full and fair disclosure or of the civil
remedies that flow from registration for material misstatements and omissions of
fact.
Id. (citations omitted); see also infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
47. See CHARLES J. JOHNSON JR. & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND
THE SECuRrTIEs LAWS (1997); see also infra note 77 and accompanying text.
48. Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers, supra note 32, at 135 ("Issuers attempting
to qualify for an exemption under Regulation D are required to meet a number of
requirements that significantly add to the cost of compliance without any corresponding
increase in investor protections. These problems are especially difficult for small issuers.").
49. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text; see also infra Parts III.A-B.
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of repairing broken public and private confidences is through careful
reformation of the integration doctrine.5
The SEC has existed, since its Depression-era creation, as a theoretical
watchdog over the U.S. securities markets and as a protector of investors'
rights and market integrity.5 Unfortunately, the SEC has conducted itself
at various times through its history and in many regulatory circumstances,
as if functioning under a cloak of secrecy by refusing to explain its
positions or the doctrines upon which it bases its decisions. In fact, the SEC
has perpetuated particular ambiguities in the securities laws for many years,
by arrogantly refusing to address concerns that have repeatedly been
brought to its attention. 2 For many years, the SEC has simply ignored (or
rejected) the reform requests of scholars and practitioners on a variety of
matters. a The integration doctrine is one example of the SEC's "cloak of
secrecy" approach described above.54 Despite repeated requests and careful
analytical attacks upon the integration doctrine by scholars and
practitioners, the SEC has staunchly refused and continues to refuse to
50. See supra notes 3, 11 and accompanying text.
5 i See supra note II.
52. See generally supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text; see also infra note 61. But
see supra note 22.
53. See generally Bradford, Expanding the Non-Transactional Revolution, supra note
30, at 463-64 ("The integration doctrine has been thoroughly criticized. A number of authors
have documented the problems the integration concept causes issuers in various contexts....
The most charitable view that can be taken of the doctrine is that it has some basis in
economic theory, but simply is not worth its cost.").
Recent critics argue that the SEC ignores such reform requests for political reasons,
implying that the Chair of the SEC is beholden to the President that appoints him or her.
Such accusations have been borne out recently as Chairperson Pitt, who worked for a large
law firm in New York City prior to being appointed Chair of the SEC, a firm that
represented Arthur Andersen, amongst others, would not be a man up to the task of
reforming the SEC because his political bent would cause him to favor the status quo.
MSNBC Live (MSNBC television broadcast, June 26, 2002) (reporting on congressional
criticism of Chairman Pitt based on his close affiliation in his private practice to Arthur
Andersen and various other businesses and firms similar to those that have recently been
charged with knowingly committing accounting fraud).
Former Chairman Pitt and the Bush administration have each drawn significant fire
during the recent corporate meltdown for being weak leaders, both being too cozy with the
corporate wrongdoers and both engaging in fiery reform rhetoric, but providing little or no
action to buttress their words. See Hardball (MSNBC television broadcast, July 15, 2002)
(interviewing Eliot Spitzer, District Attorney for New York City as he harshly criticized
Chairman Pitt and President Bush); see also supra notes 3, 9.
54. Bradford, The New Safe Harbor, supra note 32, at 284 ("Once again, the SEC's
unwillingness to acknowledge or explain what it was doing has led to unnecessary
uncertainty."); see also supra note 3 1, infra notes 274-78 and accompanying text.
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provide definitive guidance or clarification in this muddled doctrinal
morass.
55
In this troubled and precarious economic time,56 with capital markets
reeling under the weight of accounting fraud, financial restatement and
admitted executive management dishonesty,57 the SEC has lost investor
confidence and continues to lose its reputation as a competent protector of
the financial markets; the agency is being harshly criticized and attacked by
both elected legislators and the general public. The SEC can no longer
exist in a world of self-inflicted criticism and skepticism based on
ambiguity and subterfuge. It is time for the SEC to begin to reform, to drop
55. See Stephen I. Glover, The Offerings That Precede an Initial Public Offering-How
to Preserve Exemptions andA void Integration, 24 SEC. REG. L.J. 3,10-12 (1996) ("The SEC
has never provided solutions to these puzzles."). But see infra Part I1.C (discussing
integration safe harbors established by the SEC over the past twenty-five years in part to
respond to integration ambiguities).
56. See supra notes 4,8; see also Ameet Sachdev, Dow Dives to 4-Year Low: Sell-Off
Deepens; 'People Are Really Feeling Pain Now,' Cui. TRW., July 20, 2002, at 1-1 ("The
Dow Jones Industrial average shattered its post-Sept. I low Friday [July 19, 2002] in a
dramatic 390-point sell-off, adding to the already gloomy atmosphere on Wall Street soured
by accounting scandals and company collapses."). Reacting to executive dishonesty and
corporate scandal, including new revelations that Johnson & Johnson and Chicago based
Nicor Inc. had engaged in new corporate misbehavior, the U.S. capital markets plunged to
four year lows as investors seem unwilling to invest in a market that appears capable of
further volatility. See id.; see also Jon Van, Accounting Woes Fuel Nicor Stock Plunge, Cmi.
TR B., July 20, 2002, at I- I ("Nicor Inc. became another victim of Wall Street's wrath Friday
[July 19, 2002], as its shares plunged to a 10-year low after it revealed questionable
accounting practices that will lead to a restatement of earnings.").
57. See supra note 10; see also We All Got Burned-What Now?, CNN MONEY, July
19, 2002, available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/07/19/pf/investing/market_survival/
index.htm (accessed from homepage by entering title in CNN/Money search engine) (last
visited Mar. 13, 2003) ("The carnage continues, with stocks having lost ground in nine of
the past 10 sessions, culminating in Friday's near 400-point drop on the Dow. Even
seemingly good news (on the economy and on earnings) stand no chance against the
lingeringstench of accountingfraud and other corporate shenanigans." (emphasis added)).
The White House has been slow to respond to the corporate scandals that have rocked
the U.S. markets, but Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill and President George W. Bush
seemed poised to take a stand:
Angered by news of yet another major accounting scandal, this time at long-
distance-telephone giant WorldCom, O'Neill urged Bush to make greedy CEOs
pay for their crimes. "A kid caught with halfa pound of marijuana gets more jail
time than a corporate executive," he said. "That's not square." Bush emphatically
agreed.... O'Neill went on to detail how WorldCom executives played with the
numbers, hiding nearly $4 billion in losses. "Can you imagine that?" he asked.
The president frowned. The two men sat, shaking their heads.
Martha Bran & Michael Isikoff, Going After Greed, NEWSWEEK, July 15, 2002, at 20.
58. See supra notes 3, 9, 11, 53.
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the secrecy cloak and allow practitioners and scholars to understand the
reasoning and ambiguities of its approaches. In truth, now is the time for
the SEC to overhaul its antiquated systems and fix the areas of the law that
are in need of significant repair, including importantly, reforming the
integration doctrine."
Significantly repairing and reforming the securities reporting system
would be an important step for the SEC in winning back U.S. investor
confidence in the capital markets and in the disclosure system through
which those markets are protected. Further, resolving the integration
conundrum would show that the agency is responsive to the concerns of
securities practitioners and is not deaf to the concerns of scholars who
thoughtfully criticize specific SEC doctrines and actions. Bringing about
such reforms now would serve to preserve two important non-competing
interests: restoring consumer and investor confidence and clarifying the
capital raising process for issuers of securities.
In this Article, I will first briefly discuss the background of the
integration doctrine and describe the U.S. market conditions at the time the
doctrine was created. Second, I will turn my attention to the current
peculiarities of the integration doctrine and discuss the criteria the SEC
uses when applying the integration doctrine test. Third, I will add my voice
to the chorus of criticisms levied against the SEC, its integration doctrine,
and the tests that the doctrine requires. Fourth, I will briefly review what
has been written and proposed by various scholars and securities
practitioners who have virtually pled with the SEC to alter its integration
approach. I will argue fifth that the integration doctrine can be useful and
is still necessary, despite recent and strenuous calls for the doctrine's
abolition. Finally, after arguing that integration is still a useful doctrine, I
will propose various remedies that the SEC should consider adopting in
order to mend the regulatory nightmare that is the integration doctrine, and
59. Admittedly, reforming the integration doctrine, while important, is not the most
pressing area of securities law reform needed. Unquestionably, establishing a system of
accounting accountability seems to be an area most in need of immediate attention and
reform. In fact, the recently passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act addresses various areas of corporate
reform including prison terms for up to ten years for individuals "using any scheme or
artifice to defraud investors" and prison terms for up to ten years for senior corporate
executives who "recklessly" or "'willfully' publish misleading financial statements." Sanger
& Oppel, supra note 20 ("The Senate bill passed tonight was a result of a frenzy of bill
writing in which Republicans and Democrats seemed to compete to show who could be
tougher on corporate malfeasance. Amendments that were considered dead only a few weeks
ago passed by comfortable margins."); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
Analysis of such reform and ideas for accountability are beyond the scope of this article.
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ultimately to move toward improving investor confidence and public and
private issuer understanding of this conundrum.
Therefore, I argue here that the securities law integration doctrine is a
useful regulatory instrument, albeit one that is riddled with ambiguities and
confusion, and as such, is justly criticized. Nevertheless, calls for abolition
of the doctrine go too far; rather, aggressive revision of the doctrine by the
SEC will allow integration to continue to serve its purpose of protecting
investors from unscrupulous issuers seeking to avoid valid, required
registration. Further, in this era of sophisticated corporate malfeasance and
market scandal, the integration doctrine places an important check on
issuers, both large and small. In response to recent scandal, the SEC should
be tightening the reins on corporate disclosure through registration, not
abolishing a viable doctrine, even if the ambiguity in the doctrine is
maddening. This Article proposes to fix the integration doctrine.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Indeed, some may wonder why so much is being made of the
integration doctrine, an obscure securities law dilemma. Is it much ado
about nothing?' A cursory review of the literature reveals that much has
been written about this conundrum.6' The integration doctrine has been
passionately attacked, and attacked often.62 What is it about this doctrine
that raises the ire of so many scholars and practitioners?
An example might appropriately illustrate:
While working as a young associate at a major international law
firm in Chicago, Illinois, I was approached by a senior partner in
the corporate department, who was also the securities law
subgroup leader, and was assigned a project that dealt with what
was termed an "integration issue." A client of the firm had recently
decided to issue an offering of its common stock and we had begun
60. W111aAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING (1600).
61. See supra notes 30-33, 44, 55 and accompanying text; see also Kathryn Taylor
Frame, Note, Securities Regulation: Integration of Securities Offerings, 34 OKLA. L. REV.
864 (1981); J. William Hicks, The Concept of Transaction as a Restraint on Resale
Limitations, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 417 (1988); Ronald M. Shapiro & Alan R. Sachs, Integration
Under the Securities Act: Once an Exemption, Not Always.. . ., 31 MD. L. REv. 3 (1971);
Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Integration of Securities Offerings: Obstacles to Capital Formation
Remain for Small Businesses, 45 WASH & LEE L. REV. 935 (1988).
62. See generally Frame, supra note 6 1, Hicks, supra note 6 1, Shapiro & Sachs, supra
note 6 1, Wallace, supra note 6 1.
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to prepare the appropriate form for purposes of filing it with the
SEC prior to offering and selling the proposed underwritten
offering. The client was intending to raise capital with the common
stock transaction in order to effectuate particular corporate
improvements within the company. While in the midst of preparing
the required forms, an opportunity arose for the company to
become involved in a distinct pooled transaction organized by a
major underwriter, wherein certain warrants would be purchased
by a number of participating banks.
The senior partner, confessing that she knew the "basics" when
it came to integration, needed me to dig into the details and
instructed me to hit the books and return in a day or two with a
definite answer as to whether the two proposed offerings would be
integrated for purposes of registration. I was told that the client
would be expecting a concrete answer from us as to whether it
could participate in the pooled vehicle without worrying that its
issuance of common stock would be tainted by the subsequent
issuance of warrants in the pooled transaction. Essentially, I
needed to determine whether the issuance of warrants would be
integrated into the offering of common stock.
Two days later, and admittedly beginning at ground zero as far
as previous integration knowledge was concerned, I returned with
a battery of scenarios that basically provided no plain answer to the
integration question. I had learned that two simultaneous (or
thereabout) offerings had to fit into two discrete exemptions in
order to avoid integration. I had learned that a registered offering
could be integrated into a subsequent unregistered offering if the
subsequent offering did not fit into a discrete exemption. I had
learned that various integration "safe harbors" existed, wherein
specific simultaneous offerings would be spared integration. I had
learned that our offerings at hand did not correspond to any distinct
safe harbor. I had learned that a "five-factor" test would be applied
to offerings that did not fit into discrete exemptions or safe
harbors. I had learned that the five-factor test is ambiguous and
inconsistently applied. I had searched through previous SEC no-
action letters seeking that one exact match to the scenario at hand
wherein the SEC had decided clearly whether the offerings would
be integrated. What I did not learn, and now realize could never
have learned, was whether the SEC would definitively integrate the
two offerings being sold by our client.
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I returned to the assigning partner with this result. I discussed
the ambiguity of the five-factor test. I discussed the absence of
direction the SEC provides to the general public regarding
integration questions. I relayed the fact that no SEC no-action
letters were on point to our question of integration. I then stated
that the best answer we could give our client was that the
integration answer is not at all clear. I offered that we could guess
that, after applying the five-factor test, the SEC might determine
that the two offerings did not need to be integrated.
Needless to say, I was then verbally accosted by the subgroup
leader for failing to come up with a definite yes or no answer to the
question of whether the offerings would be integrated. The
assigning partner demanded that I return to the books and come up
with a definite answer. I headed straight to the offices of fellow
securities associates and junior partners and queried each as to
their integration knowledge. I posed the scenario and received
nothing concrete or remotely helpful in return.
I spent another day in the books and online, reading treatises
and SEC releases, which yielded absolutely nothing further, except
for more questions and confusion. I gently suggested the possibility
of petitioning the SEC for guidance through a no-action letter, and
was sternly rebuffed by the senior partner based on time
considerations and cost concerns. Finally, close to the eleventh
hour, and with the client waiting impatiently for our response, I
crafted our integration response, including a memorandum, by
awkwardly and unwieldily forcing the facts of the transaction at
hand into a discrete integration carve-out announced in Black
Box63 and Squadron,"' both published SEC no-action letters.
63. See Black Box Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act LEXIS 926, 43 (June
26, 1990) (carving out on policy grounds an exception to registration for a private offering,
during the pendency of a registration statement, to "qualified institutional buyers" and a
limited number of "participating institutional investors.").
64. See Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, & Lehrer, SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-
Act LEXIS 363 (Feb. 28, 1992) (clarifying SEC policy position announced in Black Box,
supra note 63, as being based primarily on the nature and number of offerees, not on the
unstable financial condition of Black Box). The SEC made clear in its Squadron
pronouncement that its determination not to integrate the public offering and subsequent
private placement in the Black Box decision was limited in its applicability to situations
where an unregistered offering is made to persons who would be qualified institutional
buyers and to no more than two or three large institutional accredited investors. See
Squadron, supra.
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In creating this awkward carve-out, the best answer we could
give our client was ambiguous without question. Our client was
left in the position of having to decide whether or not to involve
hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions without any
recognizably coherent or dependable integration answer. As I
continued to work on both securities issuances for this client, I was
mystified later to learn that the underwriters in the pooled
transaction required the lawyers representing the issuer to opine in
a Legal Opinion that no integration issues would arise as to the
issuer and that integration would not be required by the SEC with
any other offering outstanding. This integration wild goose chase
was repeated at least four additional times over a six-month period
as the senior partner/subgroup leader called on me to answer
similar integration scenarios for assorted clients.65
Therein lies the integration conundrum from a practical perspective.
Issuers who know very little about the integration doctrine, but know that
serious penalties will attach if two fairly simultaneous offerings are
integrated," want their attorneys to tell them definitively whether their
65. In using this very personal narrative to illustrate a practical law firm integration
problem, I choose to infer here that it is extremely likely that similar experiences occur
frequently in the corporate departments of law firms throughout the United States. See
generally Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2411, 2413 (1989) ("Stories, parables, chronicles and narratives
are powerful means for destroying mindset-the bundle of presuppositions, received
wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of which legal and political
discourse takes place. These matters are rarely focused on.") (footnote omitted). See, e.g.,
Derrick Bell, After We're Gone: Prudent Speculation on America in a Post-Racial Epoch,
34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 393 (1990); Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's
Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. LOUIS
L.J. 425 (1990); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 401 (1987). Even if, standing alone, this
personal account is the only integration difficulty of its kind, the value of the experience is
still important in that it relates a genuine personal experience that should cause concern and
reflection in regulators, practitioners, issuers/clients, and scholars similarly situated. See
generally Taunya Lovell Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of One Black Woman Law
Professor, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 46 (1990-91); Angela Mae Kupenda, Making
Traditional Courses More Inclusive: Confessions ofan African American Female Professor
Who Attempted to Crash All the Barriers at Once, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 975 (1997); andr6
douglas pond cummings, "Lions and Tigers and Bears, Oh My" or "Redskins and Braves
and Indians, Oh Why": Ruminations on McBride v. Utah State Tax Commission, Political
Correctness, and the Reasonable Person, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 11 (1999).
66. See Wade, supra note 30, at 200 ("When the integrated offering fails to satisfy the
requirements of any of the 1933 Act's exemptions from registration, the issuer faces serious
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multiple proposed public offerings will be integrated.67 Senior partners,
who know about integration, but are not very familiar with the inherent
details and ambiguities, demand from young associates clear-cut answers
as to whether separate issuances will be integrated. Associates spend
countless billable hours probing through a fog of unfortunate history trying
to ascertain, through analyzing various exemptions and contemplating the
five-factor test, whether the client is safe to make both issuances or should
complete a subsequent issuance after a previous offering has already gone
public. The associate then bills additional hours searching for the
proverbial needle in a haystack, as he or she leafs through hundreds of SEC
no-action letters looking for a fact pattern at least remotely close to the
transaction at hand.
The conundrum from a small issuer's practical perspective arises in
numerous circumstances, but it particularly arises when an infusion of
quick capital is needed to fund ongoing business concerns or when an
unexpected opportunity is presented to raise inexpensive capital, and the
need or opportunity is constrained based on an integration concern.6" Thus,
an issuer is restricted from freely raising needed capital or from joining
pooled transactions when an issuer has previously sold registered securities
within a certain time frame or has recently sold securities under discrete
registration exemptions. 9
consequences for offering unregistered securities in violation of section 5 of the Act.").
Essentially, an unregistered offering, including one that is integrated by the SEC, can result
in an injunctive action by the SEC and also in civil actions by purchasers of the unregistered
securities against the issuers of such securities, including civil penalties. Id. (citing section
12(1) of the 1933 Securities Act which grants investors the right of rescission for section 5
violations by securities issuers, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2000)).
67. Of course, the attorney can provide little guidance to issuers, because while he or
she might know a great deal about securities integration, the doctrine remains muddled, hazy
and confusing. All an integration savvy attorney can genuinely do is relay the quagmire of
confusion to his or her client.
68. See Wallace, supra note 61, at 935-36 (describing that federal securities laws
recognize two things about small issuers of securities: "(1) when regulation is burdensome
and inefficient, small issuers of securities suffer inordinately, and thus unfairly, compared
with larger companies; and (2) these small issuers confer significant economic benefits upon
American society, making them particularly deserving of relief from unnecessary legal
strictures") (footnotes omitted); see also Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers, supra note
32, at 136-37 (detailing the specific problems encountered by small business owners (small
issuers) in raising capital by the sale ofstock including severe difficulty attracting investment
bankers for underwriting services, being forced to bear the burden of selling their own issued
securities and the hardships imposed by the prohibition against general advertising).
69. See Wallace, supra note 61, at 937; see also Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers,
supra note 32, at 162-64 (describing the "significantly more harmful" impact the integration
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Before initiating a securities offering, an issuer must consult with its
attorneys to ask for guidance as to whether simultaneous securities
offerings will be integrated. After spending a measure of money for
integration-related legal fees, an issuer must state clearly in its offering
certificates that the current offering will not be integrated with any previous
or simultaneous offering currently in existence. Finally, the issuer must
obtain a legal opinion from its lawyers, wherein its lawyers opine that,
among other things, integration will not be required in the case at hand. Of
course, the client knows that a no integration opinion is hypothetical and
that the SEC can inexplicably integrate offerings if it so deems. For this
counsel, the issuer will pay considerable legal fees.70
Despite the above-mentioned practical insensibility attendant to the
integration doctrine, the doctrine's initial creation was steeped in practical
sensibilities and protection-oriented intentions.
A. Historical Review of Integration Doctrine Creation
In the decade leading up to the Great Depression, securities issuers and
stock speculators hustled the U.S. investing public into dire
circumstances.71 At the time the U.S. capital markets collapsed in the late
1920s and early 1930s, various estimates conclude that fully fifty percent
of the stock issued in the decade previous to the Depression had no value
and was proven worthless.72 In fact, prior to the market collapse preceding
doctrine has on small issuers as opposed to larger issuers that are more likely to have "an
array of financing alternatives" not available to the smaller issuer making the "tangles and
snares of the doctrine" less troublesome to larger issuers).
70. See Bradford, An Economic Analysis, supra note 45, at 602-03 (detailing fees,
including attorneys fees attendant to preparing for and registering securities). In describing
the direct expenses of preparing, filing and distributing registered securities, Bradford notes:
Attorneys must draft the registration statement and shepherd it through the SEC
review process. Accountants must prepare and audit the company's financial
statements. The company must print the registration statement and distribute the
prospectus to potential investors. In an initial pubic offering, these costs directly
associated with the preparation of the registration statement could total from
$200,000 to $500,000.
Id. at 603.
71. See JOHNsON & McLAUGHLIN, supra note 47, at 1-3.
72. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933). "[S]ome $50 billion of new securities had been
floated in the United States during the decade following World War I, of which fully half
had proved to be worthless." JoHNsON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 47, at 2. The House of
Representatives committee placed much of the blame of the market crash, "unique in
financial history," squarely on the securities industry. Id. (citation omitted). The House
committee reported:
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the Depression, few federal safeguards were in place and available to
investors when they were approached with an opportunity to invest in the
stock of emerging companies in the early twentieth century.73 This lack of
regulatory safeguards proved to be disastrous as scores of the U.S.
investing public lost fortunes during the Great Depression.74
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the U.S. Congress decided,
as the nation reeled from the effects of the market collapse and Depression,
that the capital markets in the U.S. had to be safeguarded through
congressional federal regulatory enactment.75 The U.S. investing public
The floatation of such a mass of essentially fraudulent securities was made
possible because of the complete abandonment by many underwriters and dealers
in securities of those standards of fair, honest, and prudent dealing that should be
basic to the encouragement of investment in any enterprise. Alluring promises of
easy wealth were ... made with little or no attempt to bring to the investor's
attention those facts essential to estimating the worth of any security.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933)).
73. JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 47, at 2. Historically:
Securities regulation had been the exclusive province of the states. This had been
the case since 1911 when the first blue sky law was enacted in Kansas. In the
aftermath of the crash, however, state securities laws were perceived to be
inadequate, resulting in growing pressure for regulation on the Federal level.
Id.
74. Id. at I (referring to the enormous loss suffered by investors due to the market crash
of 1929). Johnson & McLaughlin report:
Between September 1, 1929 and July 1, 1932, the aggregate market value of all
stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange... had declined from an all-time
high of close to $90 billion to less than $16 billion, a loss to which, in the words
of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, "the annals of finance present no
counterpart."
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 73-1455, at 7 (1934)).
75. Id. at 3. One of the first things President Roosevelt did upon being inaugurated was
call upon Congress to create remedial legislation that would protect U.S. investors:
I recommend to the Congress legislation for Federal supervision of traffic in
investment securities in interstate commerce.
In spite of many State statutes the public in the past has sustained severe
losses through practices neither ethical nor honest on the part of many persons and
corporations selling securities.
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any action
which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued
securities are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or that the
properties which they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new
securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity
and information, and that no essentially important element attending the issue
shall be concealed from the buying public.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1-2 (1933)). The drafting of legislation eventually fell
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needed to be protected from unscrupulous sellers and fraudulent issuers of
securities whose duplicity had precipitated the Depression.76 In order to
protect the investing public, Congress enacted the 1933 Securities Act,
which became, for the most part, an act of disclosure." The President, the
Congress and the drafters believed that required disclosure of pertinent and
crucial business information, including profits, debts and earnings, would
give the investing public protection and knowledge.7"
The 1933 Securities Act needed an agency to police the required
disclosure of information that would be forthcoming as required by the new
law. Initially, the 1933 Securities Act assigned original administrative
responsibility for enforcement to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).79
The SEC soon thereafter became the regulatory agency with primary
responsibility for administration of the 1933 Securities Act,8" but not before
the FTC promulgated the securities integration doctrine concept in an early
interpretation of the 1933 Securities Act disclosure requirements.8'
primarily on the shoulders of then professor Felix Frankfurter, and after a number of
revisions and consultations with Wall Street lawyers, the draft legislation became the
Securities Act of 1933, officially enacted May 27, 1933. Id. at 4.
76. See supra notes 72-74.
77. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000). Johnson and McLaughlin report that:
The essential elements of the 1933 [Securities] Act consist of (a) mandatory full
disclosure in a registration statement filed with the Federal Trade Commission
(later the SEC), (b) SEC review during a "waiting period," at the end of which
sales could commence, (c) mandatory delivery of a prospectus at or before the
delivery of the security, and (d) civil liabilities for untrue statements and for
certain omissions.
JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 47, at 4.
78. JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 47, at 4. Ultimately, the 1933 Securities Act
can best be categorized as a disclosure statute. "Its principal purpose, as set forth in its
preamble, is to provide 'full and fair disclosure' of the character of securities sold in
interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails." Id. at 6; see also id. at 3-6.
Professor Frankfurter explained the disclosure of information afforded through the 1933
Securities Act as follows: "Unlike the theory on which state blue-sky laws are based, the
Federal Securities Act does not place the government's imprimatur upon securities. It is
designed merely to secure essentialfacts for the investor, not to substitute the government's
judgment for his own." Id. at 6 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II,
FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 53, 108) (emphasis added).
79. Campbell, The Overwhelming Case, supra note 30, at 300 n.34.
80. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404,48 Stat. 881, 908-09; see also Campbell,
The Overwhelming Case, supra note 30, at 302 & n.41.
81. Campbell, The Overwhelming Case, supra note 30, at 300. Campbell wrote that:
Over time, the task of interpreting the provisions of the 1933 Act fell to
administrative agencies and to courts. Not surprisingly, it was an administrative
agency, specifically the [FTC] ... that first constructed and promulgated the
integration concept, and, significantly, this occurred within the first year of the
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The integration doctrine originated in 1933, shortly after the passage
of the 1933 Securities Act. The FTC determined that an issuer could not
sell part of an issue using the intrastate offering exemption 2 and then sell
the rest of the issue in an interstate registered public offering.83 The FTC
decided that although a portion of the offering would be registered in an
interstate offering, thereby presumably protecting the investing public with
required disclosure of pertinent information, the transaction in total could
not be broken up into two parts, where one part of the transaction would
rely on a registration exemption thereby presumably removing the investors
in that part of the offering from the protections of required disclosure."
The FTC, and later the SEC, were both interested in protecting the
public disclosure requirements of the 1933 Securities Act, by determining
that offerings or transactions that were, by nature, single transactions, could
not be splintered into multiple transactions frustrating the investor
protection goals of the 1933 Securities Act." Therefore, the integration
doctrine eventually became an "analytical framework for determining
whether multiple securities transactions should be considered part of the
same offering. This analysis helps to determine whether registration under
section 5 of the Securities Act is required or an exemption is available for
the entire offering."86
Upon the heels of the FTC ruling responsible for originating the
integration doctrine, the SEC held that even a single sale to a non-resident
could destroy the section 3(a)(1 1) registration exemption. 7 In 1938, the
SEC reaffirmed the FTC's previous integration decision by combining
effectiveness of the 1933 Act.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1 1) (1994). Section 77c(a)(1 1) of the 1933 Securities Act
exempts securities offerings that are "part of an issue offered and sold only to persons
resident within a single State or Territory." Id.
83. Securities Act Release No. 97, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) N 1021-1029, at 2056
(Dec. 28, 1933), available at 1 I Fed. Reg. 10949; see also Bradford, Expanding the Non-
Transactional Revolution, supra note 30, at 460-61 & nn. 157-58.
84. Securities Act Release No. 97, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I 1021-1029, at 2056
(Dec. 28, 1933), available at I I Fed. Reg. 10949.
85. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. But see Campbell, The
Overwhelming Case, supra note 30, at 305 (arguing that statutory language, history and
precedent provide no compelling support for initiation of or continuation of the integration
doctrine).
86. Integration of Abandoned Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33,7943, available
at 17 C.F.R. 230.155 (2002).
87. In re Petersen Engine Co., 2 S.E.C. 893,899 (1937); see also Bradford, Expanding
the Non-Transactional Revolution, supra note 30, at 46 1.
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separate private and public offerings of company stock that had been sold
to a single private investor under section 3(b) of the 1933 Securities Act
and then registered for sale to the general public several months later."8 In
deciding to integrate the two offerings, the SEC easily found that the
section 3(b) sale was part of the same issue as the registered offering, and
upon integration, the section 3(b) exemption was destroyed. 9 This 1938
SEC decision reaffirming the FTC's integration concept articulated the
criteria the SEC would use in the future when considering integration
questions. It was at this point that the integration concept became firmly
entrenched as a SEC doctrine, and since then the SEC has not vacillated in
its position that the integration doctrine is a fundamental part of the 1933
Securities Act?
The SEC later decided in 1939 that the word "exclusively" as used in
section 3(a)(9) of the 1933 Securities Act and the phrase "not involving any
public offering" in section 4(2) of the 1933 Securities Act definitively
required that an entire securities offering fall within a single exemption. 9'
By 1939, the concept of integration in the securities law setting had been
firmly established by the FTC and the SEC. In sum, "[s]hortly after the
adoption of the Securities Act of 1933, the [SEC]'s Staff embraced the
'integration' concept as a means of ensuring investor protection [through
prevention of] issuers . . . circumventing the Act's registration
88. In re Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618 (1938).
89. Id.; see also Campbell, The Overwhelming Case, supra note 30, at n.42; Deaktor,
supra note 32, at 494-95.
90. Campbell, The Overwhelming Case, supra note 30, at 302-03. In making its
integration determination in the Unity Gold case, the SEC articulated for the first time a
series of considerations that it would weigh when trying to establish whether to integrate
separate offerings, including:
(I) the plan of distribution, i.e., whether the plan to distribute the securities includes as
well the distribution of other securities;
(2) the means of distribution, i.e., the methods of sale and distribution;
(3) the classes of securities offered;
(4) the general terms on which the securities were offered;
(5) the timing of the offerings; and
(6) the use of the proceeds from the offerings.
Deaktor, supra note 32, at 495. The SEC did not, when articulating the above factors in
Unity Gold, specify the relative weight to be accorded each factor, but these factors have
since provided the framework for integration analysis since that time and provide the
foundation for the current SEC integration test. See id.
9 1. Bradford, Expanding the Non-Transactional Revolution, supra note 30, at 461; see
also Letter of General Counsel Relating to Sections 3(a)(9) and 4(1), Securities Act Release
No. 33,2029, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) M 2140-2141, at 2584 (Aug. 8, 1939), available
at 11 Fed. Reg. 10953.
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provisions."92
B. Historical Review of Integration Doctrine Applications
Following a flurry of FTC and SEC activity from 1933 to 1939, which
served to establish the integration doctrine in the securities law arena,
93
silence prevailed for the next twenty years as far as integration was
concerned. 94 Just two cases addressing integration issues are on record
between 1939 and 1959, where the SEC in one case relied on the Unity
Gold standard to integrate two offerings. 9 The federal courts offered little
enlightenment with respect to the integration doctrine over that same
dormant time period.96 The courts likely had little familiarity with securities
laws at that time, and they encountered the integration question
infrequently. When the courts did entertain the integration question, they
were later criticized for offering "essentially unintelligible," "confusing,"
and "useless" interpretations of the doctrine and for failing to rely upon
prior interpretations of the SEC.97
"Interestingly, [U.S.] courts did not get involved in any significant
integration matters until" the late 1950s, and even then when the courts did
get involved their contribution was limited to the acceptance of the
integration doctrine "as developed previously by the [SEC]." 98 These early
judicial decisions seem to "reflect the inherent difficulty" that
unspecialized tribunals of general jurisdiction have "in dealing with matters
as technical and complex as integration, [as] courts without hesitation
accepted the integration doctrine [basically] as it had been developed by the
[SEC] and continue to apply the doctrine [on that basis] today.""
In the early 1960s, the SEC promulgated two infamous releases that
fashioned and shaped the integration five-factor test that issuers,
92. Task Force, supra note 44, at 595.
93. See generally supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
94. See Deaktor, supra note 32, at 498 n.209 ("Research has revealed only one SEC
proceeding and one court case involving integration between 1939 and 1958.").
95. Id. (citing In re Hebert R. May, 27 S.E.C. 814 (1948) (relying on the Unity Gold
criteria to integrate section 3(b) and section 4(2) offerings); Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d
476 (9th Cir. 1942)).
96. See id. at 500.
97. Campbell, The Overwhelming Case, supra note 30, at 303-04 n.46; Deaktor, supra
note 32, at 500-01, 509; see also supra note 31.
98. Campbell, The Overwhelming Case, supra note 30, at 303.
99. Id. at 303-04.
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practitioners and scholars have grappled with for over forty years."3 In
response to the "burgeoning popularity of the intrastate exemption"10' and
aware of its "potential for abuse,"'0 2 and in response to "an increasing
tendency [among issuers] to rely upon the [private offering] exemption for
offering of speculative issues to unrelated and uninformed persons,"° 3 the
SEC issued two official releases intended to "reaffirm[] the applicability of
integration to both intrastate issues and private placements."'' At the time
the agency issued these important releases, the chairman was taking
aggressive steps to revitalize the SEC, and thus seized upon the integration
doctrine as one subject wherein decisive action could be administered.'0 5
With the release in 1961 of Securities Act Release No. 33-4434,"0 the
SEC sought to clarify specific principles underlying the section 3(a)(11)
exemption to registration. In explaining the relationship of integration to
intrastate exemptions, the release stated decisively:
Any one or more of the following factors may be determinative of
the question of integration: (1) are the offerings part of a single -
plan of financing; (2) do the offerings involve issuance of the same
class of security; (3) are the offerings made at or about the same
time; (4) is the same type of consideration to be received; and (5)
are the offerings made for the same general purpose.0 7
Thus, the integration doctrine five-factor test was born.
100. Exemption for Local Offerings from Registration, Exchange Act Release No.
33,4434, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 2270, at 2608 (Dec. 6, 1961), available at 26 Fed.
Reg. 11896; Non-Public Offering Exemption, Exchange Act Release No. 33,4552, 1 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2770, at 2918 (Nov. 6, 1962), available at 27 Fed. Reg. 1316; see
also Glover, supra note 55, at 10 ("Release No. 33-4352, which was issued in 1962, remains
the SEC's most important pronouncement on integration. In this release, the SEC identified
several factors that should be taken into account in determining whether separate securities
offerings should be integrated and treated as part of the same offering.").
101. Deaktor, supra note 32, at 501.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 503 (alterations in original) (citing 27 Fed. Reg. 11, 316 (Nov. 6, 1962)).
104. Morrissey, supra note 32, at 56 (footnote omitted).
105. See generally id. at 56 & n. 147 (citing R. CARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION
52-59 (1982)) (explaining that in the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy's SEC
chairman, William L. Cary, aggressively revitalized the SEC).
106. Exemption for Local Offerings from Registration, Exchange Act Release No.
33,4434, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2270, at 2608 (Dec. 6, 1961), available at 26 Fed.
Reg. 11896.
107. Id.
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In a development stunning to practitioners at the time," 8 the SEC
announced that "any one of the factors could be controlling"' when
considering integration questions, thereby allowing that any one of the five
enumerated factors alone could be conclusive in integration deliberation. "°
Also remarkable to practitioners and scholars, then and now, was the SEC's
failure to provide any insight regarding the interrelationship between the
five factors or the weight that should be afforded each when conducting
integration analysis."'
With the second release in 1962, Securities Act Release No. 33-4552,' 12
the SEC sought to describe the limitations on the availability of the section
4(2) private offering exemption to registration."' In explaining the
relationship between integration and the private offering exemption, the
SEC reiterated the exact five-factor test it had enumerated in the 1961
release."" Interestingly, however, the introductory comments to the five-
factor test stated "[tihe following factors are relevant to the question of
integration... ."' " The SEC did not comment on this language disparity,
and any conclusions drawn by practitioners, commentators or issuers were
only speculative as to whether any significance should be attached to the
language disparity.
108. See Deaktor, supra note 32, at 502 ("Beyond this recitation the SEC did not
provide any insight into the definition or interrelationship of the factors denominated as
determinative, nor did it offer any reason for its exclusion of the method of distribution as
a factor. Even more significant was the unprecedented pronouncement that any one of the
factors could be controlling.") (footnotes omitted).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 502-03 ("Such a general guideline, without further refinement, engendered
maximum theoretical uncertainty.") (footnotes omitted); see also Morrissey, supra note 32,
at 56-57.
11i. Glover, supra note 55, at 11 ("The SEC has never ... [g]iven any clear guidance
as to the relative weight that should be assigned to each factor. The SEC has indicated that
transactions may be integrated even if all five factors are not present."); see also infra Parts
III.A-B.
112. Non-Public Offering Exemption, Exchange Act Release No. 33,4552, 1 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 2770 (Nov. 6, 1962), available at 27 Fed. Reg. 11316.
113. Id. 12918.
114. Id; see also Deaktor, supra note 32, at 503 ("Less than one year later, the SEC
repeated almost verbatim the formula for applying integration enunciated in Securities Act
Release No. 4434. The occasion was Securities Act Release No. 4552.... Significantly, the
SEC introduced in Securities Act Release No. 4552 the five factors adopted in Securities Act
Release No. 4334 with markedly different language: 'The following factors are relevant to
[the] question of integration. ) (alterations in original); Morrissey, supra note 32, at 56.
115. Non-Public Offering Exemption, Exchange Act Release No. 33,4552, 1 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 2770, at 2918 (Nov. 6, 1962) (emphasis added), available at 27 Fed. Reg.
11316.
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Again, remarkably, when given the opportunity in its 1962 Release to
elaborate on the interrelationship between the five factors and the relevance
and weight each factor might carry, the SEC refused to provide any insight
or guidance.'16 Much of the criticism lodged against the SEC with regard
to the integration doctrine stems from the SEC's initial, and now
subsequent refusal to provide clear guidelines to its five-factor test, and
whether weight or relevance should attach where some, but not all, factors
are present in different issuances."'
While the SEC is harshly criticized for its refusal to provide guidance
with respect to its integration doctrine five-factor test,"' and has been
plainly criticized for even initiating the integration doctrine,1 9 it has
provided some guidance in the integration minefield by promulgating
various safe harbor rulings that definitively state circumstances in which
various simultaneous offerings will not be integrated.
C. Integration Safe Harbors
The SEC may have consciously balanced the vague nature of its
integration criteria against various clear-cut safe harbor provisions designed
to lend some certainty to the integration problem. 20 Such safe harbor rules
give careful issuers and practitioners certain assurances that particular
financings, when arranged to take advantage of the safe harbor, will not be
integrated, despite the five-factor test.
The SEC's integration safe harbors appear in Rule 152,121 Rule 147,122
Regulation D,'23 Regulation A,124 Regulation S,1 2 Rule 701,26 and Rule
116. Deaktor, supra note 32, at 505 ("As in Securities Act Release No. 4334, the SEC
in Securities Act Release No. 4552 refused to elaborate on the substantive nature of each of
the five factors; nor did it indicate the degrees of 'relevance' which should be accorded
them."); see also Morrissey, supra note 32, at 57 ("In neither of the releases did the SEC
expand on the meaning of the five factors, nor did it indicate how they should be weighted
when applied to a series of offerings where some but not all the factors were present.").
117. See supra notes 108-16; see also infra Parts III.A-B. But see supra note 22
(describing the impetus the SEC may have in initiating vague rules and doctrines in order
to maintain a certain flexibility).
118. See generally infra Parts III.A-B.
119. See infra Part IV.A. 1.
120. See Morrissey, supra note 32, at 57.
121. 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1999).
122. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1999).
123. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1999).
124. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c) (1999).
125. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.904 (1999).
126. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (1991).
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144A.' If an issuer can place its offerings comfortably within a safe
harbor from integration, then the five-factor test does not apply. If a safe
harbor is not available for simultaneous offerings, the offerings are not
automatically integrated, but are then subjected to five-factor scrutiny.'28
The first integration safe harbor, Rule 152, was adopted in 1935 and
purposed to protect discrete section 4(2) private offerings from integration
if "subsequently thereto the issuer decides to make a public offering and/or
files a registration statement."' 129 Rule 152, which remains in force today,
permits "those who have contemplated or begun to undertake a private
offering to register the securities without incurring any risk of liability as
a consequence of having first contemplated or begun to undertake a private
offering."''
30
Rule 147, "the intrastate offering safe harbor," creates a six-month safe
harbor before and after Rule 147 offers and sales.13 ' "The safe harbor
protects the Rule 147 offering against integration with registered or
exempted offers and sales outside the envelope [six-month window].' 3 2
Nevertheless, the Rule 147 safe harbor is unavailable, "even for offers and
sales outside the [six-month period], if any securities of the same or a
similar class as those in the Rule 147 offering are offered or sold within the
[six-month period].""'
Regulation D's safe harbor, Rule 502(a), 34 is similar to Rule 147, and
provides for a six-month window before and after Regulation D offers and
sales. '3 "If two offerings are more than six months apart and there are no
other issuances or sales of the same security during that six-month period,
the two offerings will not be integrated."' 36 Therefore, Rule 502 under
127. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (e) (1999); see also Bradford, An Economic Analysis, supra
note 45, at 652.
128. Bradford, An Economic Analysis, supra note 45, at 652.
129. 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1999); see also Bradford, An Economic Analysis, supra note
45, at 652; Bradford, Expanding the Non-Transactional Revolution, supra note 30, at 464.
130. Exchange Act Release No. 33,305 (Mar. 2, 1935).
131. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1999); see also Bradford, An Economic Analysis, supra note
45, at 653.
132. Bradford, An Economic Analysis, supra note 45, at 653.
133. Id. at 653-54.
134. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1999).
135. Bradford, An Economic Analysis, supra note 45, at 558.
136. Bradford, Expanding the Non-Transaction Revolution, supra note 30, at 464.
Professor Bradford explains:
These integration safe harbors [Rule 147 and Regulation D] are "one-sided." They
protect from integration only the offering pursuant to the regulation in which the
safe harbor appears. The other offering that presents the integration problem is still
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Regulation D provides that offers and sales that originate more than six
months before the beginning of a Regulation D offering or originate six
months after the conclusion of a Regulation D offering will not be
considered a piece of the Regulation D offering so long as during the six-
month window there are no offers or sales of securities of the same or a
similar class, except offers and sales under an employee benefit plan.
13
The Regulation A safe harbor provision is captured in Rule 25 l(c) and
protects three categories of securities offerings from integration with
Regulation A offerings. 38 Regulation A offerings will not be integrated
with:
(1) Prior offers or sales of securities; (2) Subsequent offers or sales
of securities that are: (i) registered under the Securities Act, except
as provided in §230.254(d); (ii) Made in reliance on §230.701; (iii)
Made pursuant to an employee benefit plan; (iv) Made in reliance
on Regulation S; or (v) Made more than six months afer the
completion of the Regulation A offering.
39
Regulation S protects domestic issuers from integration through a long-
standing SEC position which provides that particular offerings made solely
to foreign investors (persons outside the United States) will not be
integrated with domestic offerings, even if those offerings are
simultaneous, provided that no selling effort is undertaken within the
U.S."4 Regulation S and Rules 901 through 904 4' contain "no formal
integration safe harbor [language], but the SEC has long [maintained] that
it will not integrate domestic offerings with simultaneous [issuances] made
abroad solely to foreign investors."'42
Rule 701 exempts securities offerings made pursuant to specific
compensatory benefit plans or compensation contracts. 43 Rule 701 (b)(6),44
subject to integration and loss of its exemption, unless it has its own integration
safe harbor.
Id. at 464 n. 187 (citing C. Steven Bradford, Regulation A and the Integration Doctrine: The
New Safe Harbor, 55 OHIO ST. L. J. 255, 270-72 (1994)).
137. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1999).
138. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c) (1999).
139. Id.
140. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.904 (1999); see also Registration of Foreign Offerings by
Domestic Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 33,4708, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I 1361-
1363, at 2,123 (July 9, 1964), available at 29 Fed. Reg. 9828.
141.17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.904 (1999).
142. Bradford, An Economic Analysis, supra note 45, at 656.
143. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (1991).
144. 17 C.F.R § 230.701(b)(6) (1999).
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an exceptionally broad integration safe harbor, protects Rule 701 offerings
from integration with "any other offering or sale whether registered under
the Act or otherwise exempt from the registration requirements of the
Act.'
'45
Rule 144(A), which serves to exempt resales of previously issued
securities to discrete qualified institutional buyers, also contains an
integration safe harbor which may, in limited cases, protect an original
offering of securities from integration with other offerings.146
Aside from the various safe harbors created by the SEC, the federal
courts are often looked to for insight into the integration scenario.
Unfortunately, those who look to the courts for guidance are met with
further confusion, dissension and ambiguity. 147 By in large, U.S. courts
have done little more than adopt the integration doctrine as developed by
the SEC. 4 In fact, it has been stated plainly that "[m]ost of the wisdom on
the integration concept is found in the Commission's rules and regulations
and the no-action interpretive letters of the Staff. The courts have been
asked only infrequently to apply the concept in order to hold offerings in
violation of the registration provisions of the Act.'
149
Further integration guidance is often sought through examination of the
SEC's staff interpretations, commonly referred to as no-action letters, as
described in the narrative above.'50 The SEC began publishing its no-action
letters in 1971 and by 1979 had "answered almost two hundred [inquiries
that] requested interpretations of the integration doctrine."1 '' An American
Bar Association Task Force on Integration found that the SEC's no-action
responses
145. Bradford, An Economic Analysis, supra note 45, at 655.
146. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(e) (1999).
147. See Campbell, The Overwhelming Case, supra note 30, at 303-04.
148. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
149. Task Force, supra note 44, at 614. The 1986 Integration Task Force Committee
further explained that most of the integration cases brought into the U.S. courts were brought
by the SEC seeking to enjoin further violations of the 1933 Securities Act, while other
integration cases were brought by purchasers seeking to rescind their purchases of the
offeror's securities. Id.
150. See generally supra note 65 and accompanying text.
151. Task Force, supra note 44, at 617. In March 1979, the SEC announced that it
would no longer issue responses to integration of securities offerings questions, because it
had been flooded with response requests and believed that the fact intensive integration
analysis would afford greater confusion on the subject. Id. In 1985, the SEC resumed
answering integration questions in no-action letters. See Wade, supra note 30, at 220-21 ("In
1985, the SEC resumed its attempt to clarify the integration question and began to respond,
once again, to inquiries concerning integration.") (citing 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 403
(Mar. 8, 1985)).
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are less useful than one might hope, due to the complexity of the
facts examined, the conflicting responses to similar inquiries, and
the Staff's insistence on articulating its decisions through the five
criteria of Release No. 4552, even in cases in which that formula
did not adequately describe the offerings' distinctive elements.
52
While no-action analysis is useful on a case-by-case basis, little useful
clarity has been added to the integration quandary by the staff
interpretations of the SEC.
The safe harbor concept created by the SEC, wherein the agency
delineates circumstances under which various and simultaneous offerings
will not be integrated, represent what could be interpreted as a casual nod
from the SEC acknowledging that perhaps some of the criticisms hailed
upon it are actually heard.'53 Nevertheless, the safe harbors do little to
provide certainty and clarity when it comes to simultaneous offerings and
the prospect of those offerings being integrated. Most simultaneous
offerings will not fit neatly into a safe harbor and will, by default, fall to the
five-factor test analysis. This five-factor analysis can be described as
nothing short of a bane to the existence of securities practitioners and
securities teachers and scholars." 4
III. BRIEF REVIEW OF INTEGRATION EVALUATION FACTORS
Apart from the contentions that the integration doctrine is conceptually
flawed and is not grounded in 1933 Securities Act language or intent,155 the
flashpoint where all commentators seem to agree is in criticism of the five-
factor test the SEC announced in the 1960s, as detailed above. 56 One
scholar, referring to the five-factor test, wrote:
Everyone seems to agree that these criteria are nearly impossible
to apply, principally because neither the Commission nor the courts
152. Task Force, supra note 44, at 617.
153. See Bradford, Expanding the Non- Transactional Revolution, supra note 30, at 470
("The integration safe harbors show that the SEC recognizes and is trying to correct at least
some of the problems with the integration doctrine. And the integration safe harbors do
ameliorate the problems transactional exemptions create, although they do not solve them
completely.").
154. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
155. See infra Part IV.A.1.
156. See supra notes 100, 107-17 and accompanying text.
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have ever adequately articulated how these factors are to be
weighed or how many factors must be present in order for
integration to occur. As a result, the area remains confusing and
dangerous. 57
A. Five-Factor Test
Perhaps the most maligned component of the five-factor test is the
ambiguity resulting from the SEC's refusal to give weight to the five
factors or to describe in any comprehensible detail the relevance of each
factor when compared against the others.'58 One author explained that:
All five factors do not need to be met in order for two offerings to
be integrated; according to the SEC, "[a]ny one or more" of the
factors may be determinative. In practice, the SEC seems to give
more weight to some of the factors than to others, and some SEC
interpretations of the integration doctrine seem to utilize factors
other than the five listed. 5
9
Each of the five factors has been broken down and criticized numerous
times by various scholars in both law review articles and treatises. In
analyzing the factors once again, I will briefly critique them and offer my
own solutions.
1. The Different Offerings Are Part of a Single Plan of Financing
When the SEC is considering whether to integrate two simultaneous
securities offerings it will closely scrutinize if the two offerings are part of
a single financing plan. 60 Despite the SEC's seeming reliance on this
factor, there is little judicial or administrative interpretive guidance.''
Neither the courts nor the SEC has specified how, or even whether, to use
any or all of the various components associated with the "single plan of
157. Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers, supra note 32, at 164.
158. JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 47, at 415-16 ("The five factors stated in
SEC Release No. 33-4552 and in the note to Rule 502 provide little help in applying the
integration doctrine. The SEC has provided no formal advice as to the weight to be afforded
to each of the enumerated factors."); see also supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
159. Bradford, Expanding the Non-Transactional Revolution, supra note 30, at 462.
160. See Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 33,4552, 1 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2770-2783 (Nov. 6, 1962), available at 27 Fed. Reg. 11316.
161. See Wade, supra note 30, at 213-14.
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financing" factor.1 62
The SEC has not instituted an explicit method of deciding when two or
more securities issuances constitute a single plan of financing. However,
some cases and no-action letters seem to establish three distinct
components when considering the single plan of financing factor: (1) the
method through which an issuer offers securities; (2) the timing of the
offerings; and (3) whether the offerings are financially interdependent.
163
The intent of the issuer at the time of origination of the first offering seems
to be determinative when determining whether a single plan of financing
was contemplated at initiation.164 Of course, analyzing issuer intent is
problematic in its own right. 6 While it is uncertain whether these three
components are necessary or even mandatory for single plan of financing
analysis, further ambiguities are present as neither the SEC nor the courts
have provided any definition or consistent application method for the three
suggested components.
66
To add to the confusion, the SEC and the courts have seemingly joined
consideration of the "single plan of financing" factor with the "same
general purpose" factor without informative discussion for so doing.
67
After nearly forty years of integration factor analysis, it is still unclear what
constitutes a single plan of financing and how important this one factor is
in considering an overall question of integration.
It seems clear that one reform step the SEC should take, and could take
easily, would be to adopt a simple and clear definition of the term "single
162. See id. at 214.
163. See 3 LOuiS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 1142, 1214 (3d ed.
1989).
164. See Bradford, An Economic Analysis, supra note 45, at 651.
165. See Deaktor, supra note 32, at 530-31 ("Suggestions have also been advanced that
'single plan of financing' encompasses consideration of the methods of sale and
distribution .... The method of distribution is too readily manipulated to warrant
significance as a determinative factor."); see also Wade, supra note 30, at 212 ("This
approach to the single plan factor requires a subjective examination of the expectations of
the issuer's management. Such an analysis of the issuer's intentions could be easily
manipulated, since an issuer's management could avoid integration by stating the it did not
intend to make subsequent offerings.").
166. See Wade, supra note 30, at 212; see also Bradford,An Economic Analysis, supra
note 45, at 651 ("[Two of the factors-whether there is a single plan of financing and
whether the offerings are for the same general purpose-are generally given greater weight
than the others. These two factors tend to overlap.").
167. See Wade, supra note 30, at 213 ("Specifically, the cases and no-action letters
commonly fail to distinguish between the single plan of financing and the same general
purpose factors. Very often the discussion of these two factors is not analytically distinct."
(emphasis added)).
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plan of financing." The SEC could also officially adopt the three relevant
components to the single plan of financing factor and provide concise
guidelines for application of these components. If a clear-cut definition or
model were made available, issuers, securities lawyers, and commentators
would be better able to consider if two or more offerings should be
integrated.
2. The Offerings Involve Issuance of the Same Class of Security
The SEC and courts, when analyzing integration questions, examine
whether the multiple offerings are of the same class of security. 6 ' In the
past, when different classes of securities are offered, such as common stock
in one offering and preferred stock in a second offering, the SEC and the
courts have not integrated the two offerings." 9 While this factor seems
straightforward, commentators have argued that securities of different
types, i.e., common versus preferred versus convertible, does not
necessarily mean that they are of different classes.' One leading scholar
declared that if the identity of the issuers initiating the simultaneous
offerings are different (meaning separate), then their securities are
"irrebuttably dissimilar and nonintegration would appear to be
mandatory."'' Further, the argument posits that in analyzing whether the
same class of securities is being offered in simultaneous offerings, a second
consideration must be the identity.of the offerees.17 If the simultaneous
"offerings are not directed to the same pool of potential investors, this will
be supportive of a position that the classes of securities are different."' 73
The cases, SEC releases, and no-action letters offer scant guidance as
to the relevance of this "same class of security" factor in the overall
168. See Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 33,4552, 1 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (Nov. 6, 1962), available at 27 Fed. Reg. 11316.
169. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 163, at 1240 ("At times, slight differences
between two securities have nonetheless been held to justify nonintegration.").
170. See generally Deaktor, supra note 32, at 531-33 (describing analysis where
identities of issuer and offerees are the most germane considerations to identifying same
class of security).
171. Id. at 531. Furthermore, "in determining whether two entities are in fact separate,
their financial independence appears to be most important. The fact that the entities have one
or more controlling persons in common will not automatically result in their being treated
as a single issuer." Id.
172. Id. at 532.
173. Id. at 532-33. Moreover, "[b]ecause the same class of security factor is
traditionally significant, the identity of the issuers and of the offeree pool is apt to be of
substantial importance in the final integration decision."Id.
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integration analysis. A further frustration is the failure of the SEC or the
courts to clearly articulate a formula to follow when actually determining
whether the securities are of the same class. 7 4 The ambiguity is
exacerbated by some scholarly analysis that the "same class of security"
scrutiny is simply a consideration of the type of security, whether the
securities are common, preferred, convertible, etc. If different, they are not
the same class of security.'75 Conversely, scholars argue that the class of
security, regardless of its type, must be measured by identifying the issuer
and the offeree.'76
It has been suggested that because the SEC refuses to clearly articulate
what actually constitutes the "same class of securities," issuers are free to
manipulate the registration system by offering securities that are only
different in order to avoid integration."' This represents a failure to
appropriately protect investors.
Again, a simple reform the SEC should make, and could make easily,
would be to adopt a simple and clear definition of the term "same class of
security." The agency could officially adopt the position that it will always
consider the identity of the issuer and offeree when making "same class of
security" integration determinations, and decisively state that different
issuers or dissimilar pools of investors will result in a non-integration
determination. The SEC could also clearly state what types of securities
will be considered and compared, and make official the presumption that
different types of securities will lead to a determination that they are not the
"same class of security." If clear-cut definitions were made available,
174. See Wade, supra note 30, at 216.
175. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text; see also Non-Public Offering
Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 33,4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (Nov. 6, 1962),
available at 27 Fed. Reg. 11316.
176. Seesupra notes 18-73 and accompanying text. One commentator seems to indicate
that this "same class of security" analysis would best be undertaken by first identifying the
type of security in both offerings, and then, if the same type of security is being offered in
both issuances, before integrating the transactions, identifying the issuers and the investors
to determine if varying offerors and offerees saves the offering from integration. See Loss
& SEUGMAN, supra note 163, at 1240-41 (noting that "[t]he fact that two or more offerings
are of the same class will not automatically lead to integration, for example, if the securities
involve separate projects and have separate investors or if the balance of other factors does
not favor integration.") (citation omitted).
177. See Wade, supra note 30, at 217-18 (describing that "(e]ven where the offered
securities differ greatly, thereby rendering this factor inapplicable and possibly resulting in
a non-integration position, investors might still benefit from the protection that registration
provides. This illustrates that the same class of security factor sometimes fails to reflect the
Act's goal of investor protection") (citations omitted).
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issuers, securities lawyers and commentators would be better able to
consider if two or more offerings should be integrated.
3. The Offerings Are Made at or About the Same Time
Another factor the SEC and courts will examine when determining if
two or more securities offerings should be integrated is whether they were
made at or about the same time.'78 Because the SEC has created various
safe harbors that allow for integration-free offerings when the multiple
offerings are separated by at least six months, or are outside the six-month
window,'79 this "at or about the same time" factor is perhaps the least
weighty of the five factors. 8 '
Still, the SEC has provided no insight into the weight or relevance of
this timing factor, leaving issuers and issuer counsel to deal blindly with an
assortment of safe harbors and timing concerns. "Issuers for whom these
safe harbors are unavailable... receive little guidance from cases and no-
action letters regarding the amount of time necessary between offerings to
avoid integration. '18' Outside the safety of the six-month safe harbors, it is
unclear how close in time two offerings must be made in order to constitute
"at or about the same time. ' Based on safe harbor analysis and simple
logic, it appears that a six-month separation between initiation of securities
offerings may create a presumption against integration.8 3
4. The Same Type of Consideration Is to Be Received
An additional factor in the test to determine if separate securities
offerings will be integrated is whether the securities are being offered in
178. See Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 33,4552, 1 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2918-2922 (Nov. 6, 1962), available at 27 Fed. Reg. 11316.
179. See supra Part II.C.
180. See Deaktor, supra note 32, at 534 (noting that "[p]roximity in time... has
seldom been determinative; even if simultaneous, one or more of the other integration factors
often will be viewed as more important") (citation omitted).
181. Wade, supra note 30, at 220 (citation omitted).
182. Bradford, An Economic Analysis, supra note 45, at 651.
183. See JAMES COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 437
(1991); see also LOSS & SEUGMAN, supra note 163, at 1241 (describing that "[t]he adoption
by the Commission of integration safe harbor rules for intrastate and Regulation D offerings
separated by six months or more from other ostensibly exempt offers suggests that a six
month period before and after an offering will be necessary to demonstrate that it was not
made 'at or about the same time"') (citation omitted).
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exchange for the same type of consideration. 8 4 While some argue that this
"same type of consideration" factor can be valuable in integration analysis
because it is based on an objective inquiry (rather than on the subjective
query required in other factors),'85 the "same type of consideration" factor
is actually rarely helpful. 86 Because cash is almost universally sought in
securities offerings, the type of consideration used in two distinct securities
offerings is rarely different, making this factor almost a non-factor. 7 One
commentator noted that "[c]ertainly, whether the same type of
consideration is received is a meaningless factor."'88
Arguments that the "same type of consideration" factor is still useful
as an element in the integration test are generally made by commentators
who observe that this element overlaps significantly with other factors,
most often overlapping with the factor relating to the general purposes of
the offering, and that the probative value of the "same type of
consideration" factor must be properly limited through a holistic
comparison to the other four elements of the test. 89 Notwithstanding this
argument, many commentators argue that the "same type of consideration"
is a useless consideration in the five-factor test. g9
5. The Offerings Are Made for the Same General Purpose
The final factor the SEC and courts examine before deciding to
184. See Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 33,4552, 1 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) IM 2918-2922 (Nov. 6, 1962), available at 27 Fed. Reg. 11316.
185. See Wade, supra note 30, at 218.
186. See Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 163, at 1242 (describing that "[t]he final factor,
'same types of consideration,' has rarely been ofmuch significance in resolving whether two
or more issues should be integrated for the simple reason that cash is the normal
consideration in both integrable and nonintegrable offers").
187. See id.; see also Wade, supra note 30, at 219 (noting that "[b]ecause cash is so
commonly sought as the consideration for a security, this factor may not provide an accurate
and reliable indication that an issuer has artificially divided its offerings to avoid the Act's
registration requirements").
188. JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 47, at 415.
189. See Deaktor, supra note 32, at 535-36; see also Wade, supra note 30, at 218-19.
Wade states that:
Where the consideration sought in exchange for two or more offerings differs, the
courts and the SEC staffoften conclude that the offerings should not be integrated.
Most offerings that have been found not to involve the same consideration,
however, generally also have been found to fail either the single plan of financing
or the same general purpose prongs of the SEC's integration test.
Id. (citations omitted).
190. See Wade, supra note 30, at 218-19; see also supra notes 186-87 and
accompanying text.
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integrate multiple securities offerings is whether the offerings are being
made for the same general purpose. 91 Although SEC no-action letters and
court interpretations are not consistent, the "same general purpose"
consideration typically refers to the use of the proceeds gained in the
securities offering.9 2 The SEC has determined that when proceeds from
different offerings were used for different purposes, those offerings were
not made for the same general purpose, including situations where proceeds
from one offering were used for financial purposes and proceeds from a
second offering were used for non-financial purposes."" The practical
approach of weighing different offerings' uses of proceeds against one
another in two separate issuances loses its appeal when the proceeds from
a single offering are used for more than one purpose.'94 Multiple uses of
proceeds by issuers in single offerings makes analyzing the same general
purpose factor in integration contexts difficult at best.' 9
Nevertheless, great confusion accompanies this "same general purpose"
factor because of its analytical overlap with the "same plan of financing"
factor.'96 Like with each of the other five factors, the SEC has never
formally indicated the weight that should be assigned the "same general
purpose" factor when analyzing integration questions.' 97 Despite the lack
of formal guidance, "[t]here have been recent indications that the SEC staff
considers the'single plan' and'general purpose' tests to be somewhat more
important than the other three tests."'9' Even if recent indications
19 1. See Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 33,4552, 1 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2918-2922 (Nov. 6, 1962), available at 27 Fed. Reg. 11316.
192. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 163, at 1235.
193. Citicorp, SEC No-Action Letter, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,605 at 86,521 (April 19, 1976); see also Stratford Employees' Cattle Program,
Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,761, at 84,048 (Mar. 8, 1974).
194. See Wade, supra note 30, at 216.
195. See id.; see also id. at 216 n.92.
196. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text. The SEC and courts will often
analyze the "single plan of financing" and the "same general purpose" factors in such away
that blurs the individual characteristics of each factor. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note
163, at 1235 (noting that "when the Commission staff or a court finds a 'single plan of
financing,' the discussion will not be analytically distinct from a finding of 'same general
purpose,").
197. See Wade, supra note 30, at 214.
198. JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 47, at 416 n.58. While acknowledging that
the SEC has failed in providing guidance in integration analysis, close review of SEC action
by scholars indicates that:
[n]either the Commission nor the courts have provided express guidance on how
to weigh these factors when analyzing an integration problem. A review of the
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demonstrate that the "single plan of financing" and "same general purpose"
factors are now given greater consideration, it is still the case that not all
of the factors must be present to justify integration. 99
Again, it seems clear that one reform the SEC should make and could
make easily, would be to adopt a simple and clear definition of the term
"same general purpose." If the "same general purpose" factor relates
exclusively to use of proceeds generated in a securities offering, the SEC
should so formally specify and then adopt guidelines that would identify
the similar uses of proceeds that would ultimately constitute the same
general purpose. Explicit definitions of "same general purpose" and "single
plan of financing" would clear the blurred line that exists between the two
factors and allow issuers more certainty in deciding when to offer securities
issuances. If a clear-cut definition or model were made available, issuers,
securities lawyers and commentators would be better able to consider
whether two or more offerings should be integrated.
Unfortunately, the integration problem is vastly more complex and far
reaching than the simple adoption of clear definitions, as proposed above,
could possibly hope to resolve. While the adoption of clear definitions
would be a first step in addressing the integration conundrum, much more
is needed to repair the integration quandary.
B. Criticisms, Ambiguities and Misunderstandings
The integration doctrine has been ridiculed and scorned by issuers,
securities lawyers, scholars, professors and judges, almost since its
inception." ° It has drawn this attention and derision because at its root, the
doctrine is misleading, confusing and ambiguous,2"' leading to unnecessary
time spent analyzing it, cost in dealing with it and frustration in being
perplexed by it.2" 2 While criticism of the integration doctrine is varied,2"3
cases and no-action letters strongly suggests that the "single plan of financing"
and "same general purpose" factors normally are given greater weight than the
other factors.
LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 163, at 1242.
199. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 163, at 1242.
200. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 207-15 and
accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 30, 32, 44, 108-19; see also infra note 237 and accompanying
text.
202. See Johnson & Patterson, supra note I, at 542 (noting that "while today the
concept of integration is much maligned and remains a continuing source of frustration
because of its admittedly crude and hazy configuration, the notion of integration is a
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the foundation of the strongest criticism probably lies in the ambiguous
nature of the five-factor test articulated in 1962.2° When a securities issuer
decides to initiate two or more different offerings within a short period of
time2" 5 and deems that the various safe harbors from integration are
unavailable, that issuer must then resort to a five-factor integration analysis,
as set forth in Securities Act Release No. 4552, in order to determine
whether the multiple offerings will be integrated.
2°0
Regrettably for the issuer and issuers' counsel, the five-factor
integration test is a mishmash of undefined terms,2 °7 overlapping
considerations,2 8 "meaningless factor[s]," 2°9 imprecise elements," 0 and
inconsistently interpreted applications.21 Further complicating this
muddled doctrinal test is the SEC's original failure, and its continued
refusal, to provide guidance or clarity as to how the five-factor test should
be applied, weighted or defined.2t2 Every accessible commentator has
criticized the SEC's "imprecise and inconsistent approach,"2"3 some with
harsh attacks2"4 and others with supportive reform suggestions. 5
Because the SEC states in its release announcing the five-factor test
that any one or any combination of factors may result in the integration of
multiple securities offerings, it is not necessary to find all factors present
to integrate an offering; indeed, integration has been directed in situations
when only one of the five factors was present.216 Conversely, non-
integration has applied in cases where as many as three and four factors
doctrinal construct bor of regulatory necessity").
203. See infra Part IV.A.
204. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
205. Integration analysis is only a concern for "the many issuers who seek capital with
some regularity" and seek to initiate securities offerings often. Johnson & Patterson, supra
note I, at 548 (noting that "[flor an issuer of securities that seeks funding in the capital
markets only once, or after relatively long intervals, the metaphysical mysteries of integration
and its relationship to larger policies of the Securities Act are of no concern"). Id.
206. See Wade, supra note 30, at 221; see also supra Part III.A.
207. See supra notes 161-63, 174 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 167, 189, 196 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 180, 186-88, 190 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 161, 191 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 108-18; see also Wade, supra note 30, at 221-22.
213. See Wade, supra note 30, at 221; see also supra notes 30, 32, 44, 55, 61; infra
Part IV.A.
214. See infra Part IV.A. 1.
215. See infra Part IV.A.2.
216. See Wade, supra note 30, at 221-22; see also Charles E. Watters, SEC No-Action
Letter, 1978 WL 13303, at *4 (Apr. 24, 1978).
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were present.217 Based on this baffling structure, the integration analysis
can only be conducted on a case-by-case, fact-intensive basis.5"8 Even more
inexplicable is that in some instances the SEC, in its no-action integration
responses, ignores the five factors and examines other relevant points not
listed in the integration doctrine test. 19
Issuers and their counsel are therefore left to apprehensively determine
the SEC's probable course of integration action by relying awkwardly on
the amorphous five-factor test and comparing enigmatic precedent as
enumerated above. 20 The opening narrative related in this Article, detailing
the experiences of a young associate in an international law firm's
securities department struggling to deal with securities issuances and
integration analysis, is optimally illustrative.
IV. LITERATURE ANALYSIS
As noted herein, nearly every author who has written about the
securities integration doctrine, either in law review articles, treatises or
textbooks, has criticized the doctrine and its five-factor test.22' Even those
authors that are generally supportive of the doctrine and take the time to
describe its useful purposes, still write about it critically.22 Censure of the
integration doctrine ranges from demand for its outright abolition 23 to
suggestion for various reforms.2 4 Each of the suggested reforms has been
patently ignored by the SEC, despite the fact that many of the proposals
seem meritorious.225
A. Criticism of the Integration Doctrine
The two leading scholarly voices in the securities law integration
doctrine arena are Professors Steven Bradford and Rutheford Campbell.2 26
217. See generally Sonnenblick, Parker & Selvers, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL
66490, at *3 (Jan. 1, 1986).
218. See Wade, supra note 30, at n. 129.
219. See id.
220. See supra note 65 and accompanying narrative.
221. See generally supra notes 30, 32, 44, 55, 61; see also infra Part IV.A.
222. See generally Johnson & Patterson, supra note I; Wade, supra note 30; Wallace,
supra note 61; see also infra Part IV.B.
223. See infra Part IV.A.1.
224. See infra Part IV.A.2.
225. See id.
226. See generally Bradford, The New Safe Harbor, supra note 32; Bradford, An
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Both scholars have written intellectual pieces in the securities law area and
both have written extensively about the integration conundrum. Many other
scholarly voices have weighed in on the integration problem and have
added richly to the debate that continues to rage.227 Nevertheless, of those
two leading voices, one writes passionately and persuasively (and often)
that the integration doctrine should be forsaken and annihilated;22 the other
voice criticizes the doctrine repeatedly and harshly, but at the same time
defends it as potentially useful economically and instead offers an
alternative system which rejects the traditional transactional approach and
suggests a weighted exemption scheme that would make more economic
sense than integration.229
While many have criticized the integration doctrine and numerous
reforms have been proposed and carefully articulated, few commentators
have suggested the outright abandonment of the doctrine. Most have noted
the usefulness of integration and have tried to add clarity to the muddled
picture of five-factor tests, various confusing safe harbors and a non-
responsive SEC, by suggesting ways that the agency can straighten out the
chaos it has created with its integration puzzle.23
1. Calls for Elimination of the Integration Doctrine
Perhaps the earliest call for elimination of the integration doctrine, or
in this case, partial elimination, occurred in 1979. Citing the nebulous five-
factor formula that failed to function efficiently as a tool for resolving
integration problems, Professor Darryl Deaktor called upon the SEC to
"discard[] the formula."23' Further, Deaktor argued "the SEC should
exercise its rulemaking authority to eliminate the applicability of
integration to all offerings made pursuant to a transactional exemption
other than section 3(a)(9) [exemption for intrastate offerings]." '232
EconomicAnalysis, supra note 45; Bradford, Expanding the Non-TransactionalRevolution,
supra note 30; see also Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers,supra note 32; Campbell, The
Overwhelming Case, supra note 30.
227. See supra notes 30, 32, 44, 47, 55, 61, 163.
228. See Campbell, The Overwhelming Case, supra note 30, at 293; see also Campbell,
The Plight of Small Issuers, supra note 32, at 167. Campbell aggressively calls upon the
SEC to eliminate the integration doctrine completely by removing it from any further
consideration or analysis dealing with the issuance of securities regulated by the 1933
Securities Act. See id.; see also infra notes 233-39 and accompanying text.
229. See Bradford, Expanding the Non-Tansactional Revolution, supra note 30, at 473,
485-86.
230. See infra Part IV.A.2.
231. See Deaktor, supra note 32, at 550.
232. Id.
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Professor Campbell began suggesting as early as 1985 that the
integration doctrine should be eliminated entirely.2" In 2001, Campbell
authored an article devoted exclusively to the abolition of the integration
doctrine.234 This call for eradication was based on a careful review of the
doctrine's historical roots and an argument that the 1933 Securities Act
does not lend itself, in language or intent, to the formulation of an
integration concept. 235 According to Campbell, the FTC (and later the SEC)
simply got it wrong and through agency exuberance to give teeth to the new
1933 Securities Act, created a doctrine where one was never intended.236
The FTC and SEC are therein held responsible for developing and
promulgating a doctrine that "at its core ... makes no sense" and is "utterly
unsupported by any valid policy. ' 237 Campbell continues: "[a]s originally
signed into law, the 1933 Act contained no clear statement of an integration
doctrine. Thus, while at various points in the original 1933 Act one finds
words that can be interpreted as relevant to the matter of integration, the
statutory language is inconclusive.2 3  According to Campbell, the
integration doctrine, economically and practically, weighs down the
effective functioning of U.S. capital markets.239
233. See Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers, supra note 32, at 167 ("The solution
to these problems is not to send the staff of the Commission scurrying about to adjust the
safe harbor criteria. Instead, the proper solution is to eradicate the concept of integration.").
234. See Campbell, The Overwhelming Case, supra note 30.
235. See id. at 295-300, 305. Campbell offers:
[T]wo observations from [my] examination of the history of the integration
doctrine. The first is that the original statutory language of the 1933 Act provided
a less than compelling mandate for agencies or courts ever to adopt the integration
doctrine in the first place.... The second observation is that the entire integration
doctrine goes back to an administrative opinion rendered by the FTC only a few
months after the 1933 Act passed. Thus, the doctrine was created approximately
seventy years ago in the middle of the Great Depression by a completely
inexperienced agency interpreting a new, highly technical statutory regime.
Id. at 305; see also infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
236. See Campbell, The Overwhelming Case, supra note 30, at 301-02. Discussing the
FTC's decision to create the integration doctrine in 1933, Campbell writes "[u]nfortunately,
it was a wrong decision and one that since 1933 has generated confusion and inappropriate
outcomes. To make matters even more unfortunate, the decision was one that was not
required by the words of the Act." Id. at 301.
237. See id. at 293 ("The fundamental problem with integration is not its terms; rather,
the problem lies in the essential vacuousness of the doctrine itself. At its core, the doctrine
makes no sense. Indeed, the doctrine is so utterly unsupported by any valid policy that one
can only marvel that it has existed essentially unchallenged since 1933.") (citations omitted).
238. Id. at 295.
239. See id. at 321-22. Campbell describes the delicate balance struck by the 1933
Securities Act between investor protection and capital formation and then concludes:
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Others have suggested that near total elimination of the integration
doctrine would remove some of the "dead wood" from the SEC's disclosure
system.2" Despite these hostile criticisms of the integration doctrine and
the passionate call for the doctrine's elimination as useless and
nonsensical, 24' most commentators accept the integration doctrine as useful,
if not necessary, and write conscientiously about how best to reform the
flawed doctrine.242
2. Calls for Revision of the Integration Doctrine
Most securities scholars and practitioners agree that the integration
doctrine is a flawed and imperfect regulatory instrument. 43 In 1986, the
American Bar Association's Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities
went so far as to commission a task force to review the history and
uncertainty of the integration doctrine and propose reform initiatives.2"
Originally, the Task Force began with the ambitious goal of formulating
"an analytical matrix, based upon objective criteria, for resolving all
integration problems." '245 Despite its determined launch, the Task Force
surrendered its objective because it could not reach a general consensus
regarding appropriate reform initiatives and because they did not suppose
the SEC would welcome such a wide-ranging approach. 2" The Task Force
eventually concurred with critical securities scholars and practitioners, that
the integration doctrine was flawed and imperfect,247 and proposed a series
of broader safe harbors intended to simplify the integration maze."2 As has
With these basic ideas in hand, one is able to demonstrate that the integration
doctrine is antithetical to the balances struck within the 1933 Act and thus leads
to a mandatory disclosure regime in instances where Congress indicated that the
proper balance between investor protection and capital formation called for
investors and issuers to bargain for investment information.
Id. at 322.
240. See Homer Kripke, Has the SEC Taken All of the Dead Wood Out of Its
Disclosure System?, 38 Bus. LAW. 833, 842-43 (1983).
241. See Campbell, The Overwhelming Case, supra note 30, at 293.
242. See infra Part IV.A.2.
243. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
244. See Task Force, supra note 44, at 596 (explaining that the task force was created
"to examine the entire integration area and to make proposals that would help the
Commission and the securities bar to answer questions of integration").
245. Id. at 597.
246. See id.
247. See generally id.
248. See id. at 631-38. The Task Force first proposed a new safe harbor based on
distinctions between issuers, essentially adopting an issuer integration proposal made four
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been its practice, the SEC essentially ignored the Task Force's reform
proposals as well. 9
For over twenty years, and despite the obvious flaws and imperfections,
numerous constructive ideas have been forwarded which sought to repair
the integration doctrine's flaws and imperfections.25 Apart from the ABA
Task Force's detailed review of the integration doctrine and its carefully
presented reform initiatives in 1986,2"1 scholars, commentators and
practitioners have all forwarded additional reform proposals and have
called specifically for revision of the integration doctrine.252
In 1971, Ronald Shapiro and Alan Sachs brought one of the first
integration reform ideas to light when they suggested that a twelve-month
temporal safe harbor be initiated for multiple securities offerings. " They
proposed limiting the safe harbor to no more than two offerings in a thirty-
six month period.2"" This integration reform proposal fell on deaf ears at the
SEC.
Professor Deaktor, in a complex and thorough 1979 securities article,
called for liberalized integration safe harbors, including a three-month
temporal safe harbor.2" In order to bring peace to the integration problem,
Deaktor proposed the following:
Several alternatives are available. The simplest would be to work
years earlier by a different ABA committee wherein a three-part test for determining whether
an offering of interests in a partnership should be regarded as part of a larger offering was
projected. See id. at 631-32. The Task Force proposed that, akin to the six-month safe
harbors in Rule 147 and Regulation D, no two offerings would be integrated if they were
more than six months apart. See id. at 632-33. The Task Force further proposed that all
securities be categorized into four distinct classes: (1) common stock; (2) preferred stock;
(3) unsecured debt; and (4) secured debt, whereby simultaneous offerings would not be
integrated if they were of different classes. See id. at 633-35. The Task Force also proposed
that the purposes for securities offerings be divided into four basic categories: "(1) to raise
funds for general purposes; (2) to eliminate specific indebtedness through an exchange
offering; (3) to obtain human resources; and (4) to acquire specific properties or businesses,"
whereby offerings would not be integrated if they were made for different purposes. Id. at
635-36. Finally, the Task Force proposed a number of"policy safe harbors" wherein various
exempt offerings would be protected from integration when offered with other discrete
simultaneous offerings. See id. at 636-41.
249. See generally Wade, supra note 30, at 221-22.
250. See infra notes 253-59.
25 1. See supra note 248.
252. See infra notes 253-92 and accompanying text.
253. See Shapiro & Sachs, supra note 61, at 26.
254. See id.
255. See Deaktor, supra note 32, at 543.
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within the existing regulatory framework by retaining the five-
factor formula, but continue investor protection by moderately
liberalizing the integration safe harbor of the rules. Along these
lines, a suggestion to reduce the "dry" period required before and
after a rule offering from six to three months has already been
developed.256
Unfortunately, this integration reform proposition was ignored by the SEC.
Kathryn Taylor Frame, in 1981, protested that the existing analysis
under the securities integration formula had simply been confusing and
inconsistent.257 Frame, in suggesting integration formula reform, called
upon the SEC and various state securities commissioners to "develop a
specific objective test or definition for securities integration." '258 This
integration protest found no sympathy at the SEC.
In 1982, Ronald Fein and Brian Jacobs proposed that the integration
doctrine analysis be altered to treat all securities offerings as discrete and
non-integrable unless the two offerings are part of a single plan of
financing, involve the same class of securities, and are made
contemporaneously.259 Again, the SEC refused this reform invitation.
Professor Daniel Morrissey, in 1984, wrote comprehensively about the
integration doctrine in the context of limited partnership offerings." The
ABA's Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law and
subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincorporated Associations in
1982 produced a position paper wherein it proposed its own standards for
the integration of limited partnership offerings.26' Professor Morrissey
opposed the recommendations of the ABA committee as subversive of the
registration process and the integration doctrine claiming "[t]he American
investor and the capital markets have been well served by the great reforms
of the 1930s, and it would be unfortunate to have them eroded by the
256. Id. Deaktor continued that "[t]hese changes would constitute significant
improvements, even though retention of the five-factor formula would perpetuate an
irrational approach to integrating securities offerings. Moreover, the 'dry' periods of the
rules would continue to impose arbitrary restrictions on financing without demonstrable
commensurate benefit to investors." Id. at 544.
257. Frame, supra note 61, at 864.
258. Id. at 886.
259. Ronald L. Fein & Brian J. Jacobs, Integration of Securities Transactions, 15 REV.
SEC. REG. 785, 793 (1982).
260. Morrissey, supra note 32, at 45-46.
261. Id. at 45-46.
2002] 1359
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
ABA's ill-advised proposal." '262
In 1986, the ABA's Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities
Task Force on integration published its report and recommendations.263 As
outlined above, the Task Force set an aggressive agenda, and proposed
significant revisions to the integration test.264 Notwithstanding the scope of
the proposals, the SEC was not convinced to reform the doctrine.
Professor Perry Wallace, Jr., in 1988, authored an article outlining
obstacles to capital formation faced by small businesses, specifically
mentioning the integration doctrine as one such barrier.265 To address this
obstacle, Wallace strongly urged the SEC to adopt the Task Force safe
harbor proposals announced in 1986.266 Aside from urging the SEC to adopt
the Task Force initiatives, Wallace proposed adoption of more aggressive
modifications to the Task Force safe harbor reforms, such as a shorter
temporal safe harbor.267 This integration reform bid was shunned at the
SEC.
In 1989, Professor Lyman Johnson and Steve Patterson took issue with
the SEC's use of safe harbors, in this case Rule 152, as a means of
clarifying the "irksome" integration doctrine.268 Johnson and Patterson
262. Id. at 77.
263. See Task Force, supra note 44, at 233-38.
264. See supra note 248.
265. Wallace, supra note 61, at 937. Wallace wrote:
Many existing legal requirements and limitations inject undue restrictiveness and
uncertainty into the capital formation regulatory structure, which means that small
issuers attempting to distribute securities still must proceed in fear of substantial
adverse legal and economic consequences. And of the various sources of angst
facing the small issuer, none has proved more frustrating and elusive than the
doctrine of integration of securities offerings.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
266. See id. at 989 (noting that "[o]f the various proposals to improve the [integration]
doctrine, those submitted by the task force of the ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities are the most comprehensive and promising").
267. Id. Wallace argues that:
[t]he modifications to the ABA proposals that this Article recommends are offered
in the interest of the many small businesses that are particularly and inherently
disadvantaged in the capital formation arena. The recommendations are at times
less conservative than the ABA proposals, but they still represent a balance of the
interests of investor protection and capital formation that furthers the public
interest.
Id.
268. Johnson & Patterson, supra note 1, at 539-40. Johnson and Patterson recognize
that Rule 152 created a safe harbor for issuers as follows:
Essentially, the SEC now interprets rule 152 as precluding integration of a section
4(2) private placement of securities with a subsequent registered public offering
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argued that the "SEC should approach the whole notion of integration in a
more forthright and punctilious fashion,"269 reforming the doctrine directly
rather than through the enactment of various safe harbors.270 This
recommended approach has been ignored by the SEC.
Professor Cheryl Wade, in 1994, critically deconstructed the SEC's
five-factor test for integration and found it wanting in numerous respects.27" '
Wade further opined that the five-factor formula failed to reflect the goals
of the 1933 Securities Act and the intent of the integration doctrine. 72 To
bring integration in line with the goals of the 1933 Securities Act and the
intent of the integration doctrine, Wade recommended that the SEC initiate
a two-part integration inquiry where it: (1) adopts the safe harbor proposals
of the 1986 Task Force, adding a separate safe harbor for offerings that do
not involve the same type of consideration; and (2) adopts a "rational
business reason" test for division of offerings as protection from
integration.273 Wade's reform proposals have been disregarded at the SEC.
Also in 1994, Professor Steven Bradford analyzed a new Regulation A
integration safe harbor created by the SEC.274 Bradford noted that in
of additional securities even if the issuer contemplated the public offering at the
time the private placement commenced and undertook the public offering shortly
after completing the private placement.
Id. at 539 (footnotes omitted).
269. Id. at 540.
270. Id. The article further suggests that the "SEC, somehow, ought to face those
matters squarely, not leave the matters buried in an uncoordinated jumble of regulatory
complexity where the sheer mass of rules often makes rethinking of core premises so
difficult, but therefore so necessary." Id.
271. Wade, supra note 30, at 221-22 (noting that the "SEC's test for integration is
imprecise, inconsistently applied and easily manipulated by issuers intending to evade the
Act's registration requirements").
272. Id. at 227.
273. Id. at 236-41. Wade indicates that "[i]n this Article, I propose a less easily
manipulated and better defined integration analysis to replace the SEC's current integration
formula. The proposed analysis ... would establish a two-part inquiry to determine whether
offerings warrant integration." Id. at 236.
274. Bradford, The New Safe Harbor, supra note 32, at 255. Bradford writes:
Critics have long charged that the Securities Act of 1933 (Act) and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), which administers the Act, are insensitive to
the capital formation needs of small businesses. The Act's regulatory regime, it
has been argued, is too rigid and expensive and discourages or precludes small
businesses from selling securities. In 1992, in reaction to such criticism, the SEC
proposed a variety of rule changes designed "to facilitate capital raising by small
businesses and reduce the compliance burdens placed on these companies by the
federal securities laws." Among these "small business initiatives," adopted in the
summer of 1992, was a little-noticed, virtually undiscussed new rule-Rule
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response to the fierce criticisms heaped upon the SEC in connection with
the integration doctrine, the agency adopted several integration safe
harbors, "designed to ease some of the uncertainty inherent in the five
factor test." ' Bradford sternly criticized the SEC for its "silence in
adopting the new Rule 251(c) safe harbor" because such silence has
"produced uncertainty concerning the basic application of the rule."276
Bradford implored the SEC to "explain what the Commission is doing and
why," concluding that explanation and discussion could resolve many of
the ambiguities and uncertainties that have arisen under the integration
doctrine and its safe harbors.277 Bradford concluded that "the SEC's failure
to explain or justify provisions like Rule 251(c) produces unnecessary
ambiguity and uncertainty." '278
Bradford returned in 1996 with an expos6 on the transaction
exemptions of the 1933 Securities Act from an economic perspective. 7 9 He
developed a cost-benefit analysis wherein he analyzes the benefits of
registration against the steep costs associated with registration, and further
examines the economics of the integration doctrine and determines the
effect of multiple offerings on the costs and benefits of registration.28 °
Bradford argued that the uncertainty and ambiguity of the five-factor test
251 (c)-protecting Regulation A offerings of securities from integration with
other offerings.
Id. at 255 (footnotes omitted).
275. Id. at 266.
276. Id. at 284. In responding to two issues arising under the Regulation A safe harbor,
Bradford claims "[t]he rule and SEC commentary hardly provide a clue as to the resolution
of this issue. A single, simple comment from the SEC could have easily prevented either of
these issues from arising." Id.; see also supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
277. Id. at 289. Bradford concludes:
Rule 251 (c) appears to be a sensible contraction of the integration doctrine, but
it could have been much better. It is, in part, a victim of the SEC's unwillingness
to explain what the Commission is doing and why. The SEC has, unfortunately,
continued its regrettable practice of substantially revising the integration doctrine
in rule revisions and even no-action letters without explanation or discussion.
Id. (emphasis added).
278. Id.
279. See Bradford, An Economic Analysis, supra note 45.
280. Id. at 658. Bradford continued:
The SEC has paid little or no attention to the economics of the integration
doctrine. It has instead tried to define the concepts "offering" and "part of an
issue" metaphysically. This misdirected focus is unfortunate because the economic
model developed in this Article provides several insights into the integration
problem. In some instances, the SEC's approach makes sense; in other instances,
it does not.
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is costly because it increases risks to issuers,"8 ' increases the legal costs of
issuers,211 increases the possibility of mistakes by the SEC in particular
scenarios2 3 and increases the cost of administration. 24 Bradford concluded
"although the five factors are relevant to the economic analysis of
integration, using them may cost more than they are worth," ' because the
"gains associated with more certain rules ... could outweigh the costs
associated with underinclusiveness oroverinclusiveness, especially because
the application of the five-factor test appears so imprecise and
inconsistent. 28
6
Finally, in 2000, Professor Bradford once again addressed the
integration dilemma, this time in the context of expanding the non-
transactional nature of registration.8 7 Bradford acknowledged many of the
previous recommendations for repairing the integration doctrine and
addressed the calls for elimination of the doctrine outright.88 In concluding
that each of the revision suggestions come up short, and in arguing that
abolishing integration is short-sighted, Bradford proposed an entirely new
approach: a weighted exemption system.289 Essentially, Bradford developed
a cost-benefit formula that weighed the costs of certain exemptions and,
through his weighted exemption system, required that securities be
registered only when the benefit of registration (investor protection)
outweighed the cost.'" Under Bradford's system, which relied heavily on
the concept of aggregation, 9' the 1933 Securities Act would be freed from
281. Id. at 669. Integration potentially chills issuers' attempts to offer securities even
when offerings should not be integrated. Id.
282. See id. Legal costs are increased because issuers are more likely to need legal
advice prior to initiating offerings. Id. Further, costs are increased because it is inherently
difficult for lawyers to predict the SEC's integration position. Id.; see also supra note 65 and
accompanying narrative.
283. See Bradford, An Economic Analysis, supra note 45, at 669.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 669-70.
287. See Bradford, Expanding the Non-Transaction Revolution, supra note 30.
288. Id. at 467-73.
289. Id. at 473. Bradford proposes:
It is necessary to rethink the transaction exemptions to develop a system that
allows issuers to use multiple exemptions where appropriate but retains the
registration requirement when it is cost-effective--a system, in other words, that
is efficient, but not subject to manipulation. The answer lies in a weighted
exemption system.
Id.
290. Id. at 474-80.
291. Id. at 462-63 (noting that "closely related to the integration doctrine is the concept
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its transactional underpinnings and a sole focus on exemptions and
aggregated offering prices would replace it.292 "The integration doctrine and
its complex system of metaphysics, safe harbors, and informal
interpretations that keep the system (barely) alive should be abolished and
replaced with the weighted exemption system proposed in this Article. 293
This creative weighted exemption proposal has found no acceptance at the
SEC.
B. Support for the Integration Doctrine
Again, as noted above, the integration doctrine is a useful regulatory
instrument, albeit, one that is riddled with ambiguities and confusion and,
as such, is justly criticized. Nevertheless, calls for the doctrine's abolition
go too far, as aggressive revision of the doctrine by the SEC will allow
integration to continue and serve its purpose of protecting investors from
unscrupulous issuers seeking to avoid valid, required registration.
Acknowledgment of the genuine usefulness of the integration doctrine
has been voiced by a number of leading securities scholars. 9" Some
of aggregation, which is used to calculate the maximum offering amount in some of the
exemptions") (footnote omitted).
292. Id. at 476-77. Bradford introduces the idea that "[a]n issuer could use multiple
exemptions for a single offering, subject to an overall dollar amount limit. In calculating
whether an issuer's total sales fall within that limit, sales pursuant to each exemption would
be weighted based on the amount of investor protection the particular exemption provides."
id. at 473-74.
293. Id. at 485. Critical analysis of Bradford's weighted exemption proposal is beyond
the scope of this Article.
294. Wade, supra note 30, at 208-09 ("Inherent in the integration principle is the
concept that although issuers should be assisted in raising capital, investor protection should
be sacrificed only in the limited circumstances specified in each exemption. The SEC
devised the integration principle to avoid abuse of the exemptions from registration."); see
also Johnson & Patterson, supra note I, at 542-43 ("This remains true even as heightened
attention has been given in recent years to yet another policy objective of the Securities
Act-fostering capital formation. In this altered regulatory environment the doctrine of
integration still is needed, but the doctrine is subjected to an additional strain because it
must continue to serve the original goal of investor protection while not unduly stifling
capital formation, particularly for smaller businesses." (footnote omitted) (emphasis added));
Task Force, supra note 44, at 623-24 (describing that "new integration rules should be
devised to accomplish three objectives: to provide objective standards that minimize
confusion about their application and, correspondingly, minimize the interpretive burden on
the Staff; to eliminate doubt regarding the effect of satisfying or not satisfying a particular
test; and to require integration in a particular situation only if it would enhance investor
protection and not merely impose a greater burden to capital formation"); Morrissey, supra
note 32, at 77 ("However much issuers resent it, registration is not unduly onerous or a
serious impediment to capital formation when viewed in light of the recently liberalized
1364 [Vol. 48:1305
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commentators base their general support for integration upon the stated
goal of promoting investor protection through full and fair disclosure, and
argue that this goal is facilitated by integration.295 Most commentators
writing in support of integration do not question the authenticity of the
doctrine, nor the FTC's authority in creating it, but do acknowledge the
severe shortcomings inherent in its principles.
29 6
One commentator, when comparing the economic cost and benefit of
integrating two small offerings, approvingly finds that:
[s]urprisingly, the much-maligned five-factor integration test
developed by the SEC helps to determine when the additive view
is likely to be correct and when, because of differences between
the two offerings, integration makes less sense. All five factors
have at least some relevance to the costs and benefits of registering
the combined offering.297
It is therefore evident that a number of scholars have found integration
to be useful from an economic perspective in some cases.298 Still, the
greatest support for the doctrine is found in the writings of those who
believe it protects investors by requiring that two offerings, that likely
should have been offered as a single issuance in the first place, be
integrated. 2" Notwithstanding this support expressed for integration, the
most recent and persistent voices have called for the abolishment of the
exemptions and the SEC's steady attempt to expedite the process. Perhaps the true aversion
many issuers have to registration is based on fear that the SEC or state authorities might
deem their offering materials to contain inadequate disclosure or to present unfair investment
opportunities."); Wallace, supra note 61, at 989.
295. Wallace, supra note 61, at 989 (arguing that "[t]he SEC should give serious
consideration to the ABA proposals as modified by the recommendations outlined in this
Article. The result of such consideration could well be the beginning of a truly useful and
workable doctrine of integration of securities offerings" (emphasis added)); Morrissey,
supra note 32, at 46 (noting that "[t]he Article will then conclude by urging rejection of the
subcommittee's new test and continued use of the integration criteria articulated in recent
judicial opinions. These steps are necessary to safeguard the prime tool of investor
protection, the registration process").
296. See supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text. But see supra Part IV.A. I
(characterizing recent calls for elimination of the integration doctrine).
297. Bradford, An Economic Analysis, supra note 45, at 666. Bradford concludes
"[tihus, the five factors considered by the SEC in deciding whether to integrate offerings
have some justification in economic theory." Id. at 668.
298. See supra notes 295-97.
299. See supra notes 294-95.
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integration doctrine."°
V. THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE AS AN ONGOING CONCERN
Despite a passionate call for eradication of the integration doctrine and
a creative call for a completely new exemption-based approach, I add my
voice to the integration doctrine mix and argue here that securities
integration should continue as a viable securities law doctrine, although it
must be reformed to truly function effectively. The exasperation described
vividly by integration critics is not lost on me, as I have suffered and
struggled on many occasions through the quagmire that is integration.
Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, some policy, some practical, the
integration doctrine should be repaired, revised and reformed.
A. Policy Reasons Why the Integration Doctrine Should Remain
In 1933, when the 1933 Securities Act became law and when the
integration doctrine was announced, the primary focus of lawmakers, and
later the SEC, was to protect investors through full and fair disclosure of
important material information thought necessary for making sound
investment decisions.3"' The integration doctrine arose over a concern that
registration requirements would be improperly avoided by unscrupulous
securities issuers who would splinter single offerings of securities into
separate smaller offerings that would then be forced into discrete
exemptions from registration, thereby depriving investors of that full and
fair disclosure mandated by the 1933 Securities Act.3"2
For twenty years following the initiation of the integration doctrine,
investor protection was the most important consideration in securities
issuances."0 Slowly, there arose concerns that the opportunity to raise
capital by various businesses and corporations was being constrained by the
registration requirements of the 1933 Securities Act, particularly by the
integration doctrine.3"' Eventually, small issuers were identified as the
300. See supra Part IV.A. 1.
301. Wade, supra note 30, at 227 (describing that "[b]ecause the current test for
integration was formulated at a time when investor protection through registration was the
predominant policy of the Act, it places undue emphasis on disclosure through
registration."); see also supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text (describing the early focus
on protecting the investor).
302. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
303. See id.
304. Wallace, supra note 61, at 941 (reporting that "[b]ecause of the inadequacies in
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parties that were most restricted by the registration requirements of the
1933 Securities Act, and the integration doctrine was identified as being
particularly offensive to the capital-raising ability of said small issuers.3 5
In response to these criticisms, the SEC created various safe harbors
that enabled small businesses and other issuers easier access to the capital
markets by exempting certain offerings from registration." In spite of the
safe harbors, recently much has been written about the continued plight of
the small issuer, and the SEC has again been called upon to ease the
registration requirements for smaller issuers.30 7 Very little has been written
or voiced recently in connection with investor protection and the goals
associated therewith. Until now.
Investor protection is the key ingredient in the 1933 Securities Act, as
it imposes the requirements of registration "in order 'to provide full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails' in the interest of investor protection.3 °s
Today, in a market ruled by volatility and violent swings," and in this
current environment of corporate wrongdoing10 and company management
criminality,3" perhaps at no time in history, apart from the early 1930s and
the Great Depression, has there been a greater fundamental need for
investor protection.
Investors need to be protected now more than ever."' Just like in the
market collapse of the late 1920s and early 1930s, the current crisis is being
fueled largely by the fraudulent actions and criminal behavior of the issuers
of securities.31 3 The comparison between corporate and issuer wrongdoing
the present approaches to the integration doctrine, capital formation has suffered. For small
businesses in particular, the spectre of regulatory reproach and private litigation can easily
dash capital formation plans").
305. Id. at 941-42; see also Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers, supra note 32.
306. See supra Part II.C.
307. See Wallace, supra note 61; Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers, supra note 32;
Glover, supra note 55.
308. Wallace, supra note 62, at 943 (quoting Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, title 1, 48
Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982)) (emphasis added).
309. See supra notes 4, 8, 56; see also infra notes 314, 320, 323.
310. Seesupra notes 6, 10, 15, 17.
311. See supra notes 7, 8; see also infra notes 314, 324.
312. With billions upon billions of dollars being invested in the stock market today and
with millions of people basing their retirement plans almost solely upon the U.S. markets,
protections must be put into place to safeguard the futures of investors. See Greg Bums,
Scandals Shake Faith in Big Business, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 2002, at A- I. Particularly, steps
must be taken to protect investors from corporate wrongdoers.
313. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text (describing the historical market
collapse leading to the Great Depression); see also supra notes 6-8, 10, 15, 17 and
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by perpetrators of securities fraud in the 1930s and those corporate
criminals today, particularly in the cases of Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom,
is startling.314 The mandate of the 1933 Securities Act is to protect investors
accompanying text (describing the corporate malfeasance that plagues the capital markets
today).
314. Congress reported in 1933 that over half of the securities sold in the decade
following World War I were worthless because the securities issuers inflated earnings
figures, deceived investors and lied about the worth of their respective companies. JOHNSON
& McLAUGHLIN, supra note 47, at 1-5. By hiding expenses in various complex accounting
maneuvers, inflating earnings projections, deceiving investors and lying about the worth of
their respective companies, WorldCom, Enron and Tyco executives were promoting
securities that are now worthless. See supra notes 6, 8, 10, 15; see also infra note 324.
Based on their fraudulent representations and flagrant violations of securities laws, two
former WorldCom executives were arrested and charged with fraud and conspiracy. 2
Former WorldCom Executives Face Federal Fraud Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/business/AP-WorldCom.html (url no longer
available) (on file with author). The New York Times reports that:
Two former WorldCom executives [former Chief Financial Officer Scott Sullivan
and former Director of General Accounting Buford Yates] surrendered Thursday
[August 1, 2002] to face fraud and conspiracy charges accusing them of hiding
$3.8 billion in company expenses from investors in the now bankrupt
telecommunications giant.
The arrests were the second in two weeks of executives of large corporations
that have filed for protection from creditors in bankruptcy court. Federal agents
led the pair out of New York's FBI headquarters in handcuffs at midmorning,
enroute to court. The men, both wearing dark suits, did not speak to... reporters.
Id. A seven-count complaint, unsealed in federal court Thursday, charges them with
secuiities fraud, conspiracy, and false statements to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Id. The securities fraud and false statement charges carry a maximum prison
sentence often years. If convicted of conspiracy, they face up to five years in prison. Id.
Indictments for both men were issued on August 28, 2002. Ex-WorldCom Execs
Indicted, CNN MONEY, Aug. 28, 2002, available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/08/28/
news/worldcomSullivan/index.htm (accessed from homepage by entering title into
CNN/Money search engine) (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). Both pleaded "not guilty... to
help[ing] the bankrupt telecommunications company hide more than $5 billion in expenses,"
choosing instead to take their chances with ajury. Sullivan Pleads Not Guilty, CNN MONEY,
Sept. 4, 2002, available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/09/04/news/companies/worldcom
_arraign/index.htm (accessed from homepage by entering title into CNN/Money search
engine) (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). However, a number of other WorldCom executives
pleaded guilty to related charges. WorldCom Exec Pleads Guilty, CNN MONEY, Sept. 26,
2002, available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/09/26 /news/worldcommyers/index.htm
(accessed from homepage by entering title into CNN/Money search engine) (last visited Mar.
13, 2003). ("The former controller of WorldCom Inc. [David Myers] pleaded guilty
Thursday [September 26, 2002] to federal criminal charges in connection with a $7 billion
accounting scandal at the bankrupt telecommunications company."). The press reported that:
[The plea arrangement with Myers] may help prosecutors go after Scott Sullivan,
the ex-WorldCom CFO whose plea of not guilty last month paved the way for a
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based on "full and fair disclosure of the character of securities."315 The SEC
was given full authority to implement and police the 1933 Securities Act
and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.316
The SEC has failed, in an unprecedented way, to protect the investors
future trial. Myers pleaded guilty in New York to one count each of conspiracy to
commit securities fraud, securities fraud, and making false filings with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.... Myers told U.S. District Judge Richard
Casey that, on the instruction of senior management, he falsified WorldCom's
financial statements between October, 2000, and June, 2002, by hiding costs to
make the company appear more healthy.
Id.; see also Two WorldCom Execs Plead Guilty, CNN MoNEY, Oct. 10, 2002, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2002/l0/10/news/worldcom.pleas.ap/index.htm (accessed from
homepage by entering title into CNN/Money search engine) (last visited Mar. 13, 2003)
("Betty Vinson, the former director of management reporting, pleaded guilty to charges of
conspiracy to commit securities fraud and securities fraud. Later in the day, Troy Normand,
the director of legal entity accounting, pleaded guilty to conspiracy and securities fraud for
his part in the same scheme.").
One former Enron official in November 2002 pleaded "not-guilty" to a seventy-eight-
count indictment "charging him with masterminding complex financial schemes that
enriched him and helped doom the energy-trading powerhouse. If convicted [Andrew
Fastow] technically could face a maximum sentence of 860 years in prison." Enron's Fastow
Pleads Not Guilty, USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 2002, at B I.
In September 2002, three top executives at Tyco, former CEO Dennis Kozlowski,
former CFO Mark Swartz, and former general counsel Mark Belnick were indicted on
charges that they reaped $600 million through a racketeering scheme involving stock fraud,
unauthorized bonuses and falsified expense accounts. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Two Top
Executives Charged with $600 Million Fraud Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2002, at Al.
The New York Times reports that:
The authorities accuse Mr. Kozlowski and Mr. Swartz of stealing $170 million
from the company itself and reaping $430 million more by covertly selling Tyco
stock while "artificially inflating" the value of that stock. Tyco stock has fallen 70
percent in value this year .... The New York grand jury indictments. . . also
accuse Mr. Kozlowski and Mr. Swarz of bribing a Tyco board member and several
Tyco employees apparently to try to keep the scheme secret. The indictment
accuses Mr. Kozlowski and Mr. Swarz of "enterprise corruption," a charge often
used in Mafia prosecutions.
Id. (emphasis added).
In announcing the indictment, an SEC representative claimed:
Kozlowski, Swartz and Belnick treated Tyco as their private bank, taking out
hundreds of millions of dollars of loans and compensation without ever telling
investors. . . . Defendants put their own interests above those of Tyco's
shareholders. Those shareholders deserved better than to be betrayed by the
management of the company they owned.
Id.
315. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, title 1, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 77a (1982)).
316. JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 47, at 5.
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it was created to protect.
The integration doctrine was created to protect investors.1 7 Initially, it
was supposed to discourage unscrupulous securities issuers from purposely
fragmenting offerings rather than registering them, as required by the 1933
Securities Act, thereby deceiving investors." 8 In a meaningful, yet
infuriating way, the integration doctrine has stood for investor protection
from unscrupulous issuers for nearly seventy years.
B. Practical Reasons Why the Integration Doctrine Should Remain
Aside from policy reasons and the importance of investor protection
and the economic justifications for integration, a number of important
practical considerations are evident when considering whether to abolish
or repair the integration doctrine.
One factor, overlooked consistently by commentators, is the
constructive chilling effect the integration doctrine has on prospective
securities issuers. Before initiating new securities sales, a prospective issuer
must approach its issuance cautiously, vigilantly planning, seeking advice
from legal counsel before carefullyjoining pooled transactions or initiating
its own issuance. While most commentators squash the idea that it is
productive for the issuer to incur extra costs, such as legal fees, in an
attempt to form capital, I argue that, particularly in this current environment
of corporate malfeasance, a doctrine that forces caution in corporate
executives and company management is crucial.
Another factor ignored wholesale by those who call for the integration
doctrine's demise are the scandalous intentions and criminal minds of
corporate executives and issuers of securities. Critics of the integration
doctrine get so occupied with removing obstacles to capital formation,
particularly for small issuers, that the entire eradication argument seems to
be based on a presumption that no issuer, particularly a small issuer, would
intentionally circumvent the registration rules to defraud investors. 19
Certainly, circumstances exist where a fraudulent issuer would improperly
splinter a large offering into separate, distinct issuances in order to avoid
registration, and simultaneously target investors, based on its choice of
exemption, who would be susceptible to erroneous purchase of fraudulent
317. See Integration of Abandoned Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 33,7943,
available at 17 C.F.R. 230.155 (2002).
318. See supra Part II.A.
319. See generally Campbell, The Overwhelming Case, supra note 31; Bradford,
Expanding the Non-Transaction Revolution, supra note 30.
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securities undetected by the SEC because of its non-registration status. In
this explosive capital market environment, such a scenario is not difficult
to imagine.
Further, as the economy lurches ahead in fits and starts, 320 and the
capital markets battle to avoid a significant stock market crash,321 and in an
environment where the U.S. Congress has passed legislation to regulate the
accounting profession and crack down on corporate wrongdoers,322 and at
320. See Bulls Charge Back: Dow Soars Nearly 500 Points in Second-Biggest Point
Gain Ever, Cmn. SuN-TIMES, July 25, 2002, at 1. "Stocks rode a euphoric high Wednesday
[July 24, 2002], turning in their best session in nearly 15 years, as the Dow Jones industrial
average levitated by nearly 500 points." David Roeder, Light at the End of the Tunnel...
or Was Wednesday's Near 500 Point Gain Just a Glimmer of False Hope?, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
July 25, 2002, at 47. After months of gloom and precipitous drops in the capital markets, the
near 500-point rally caused much speculation as to whether the markets were rebounding or
bouncing. See id. at 52 ("Not all analysts are convinced the rally will hold. 'Every time
we've had one of these violent rallies, it's been a classic bear market bounce with no follow
through,' said Todd Clark, head of listed equity trading at Wells Fargo Securities."); see also
Matt Krantz, Markets Extend Winning Streak: 'Turn in Psychology'Might Signal Rebound,
USA TODAY, July 30, 2002, at IA ("In what is shaping up to be the stock market's most
impressive showing this year, an explosive rally Monday [July 29, 2002] sent the Dow Jones
industrial average to its second gain of 400 points or more in a week, fanning hopes that the
worst might finally have passed."). But see Alexandra Twin, Bears Rage on Wall Street,
CNN MONEY, Aug. 2, 2002, available at http://money.cnn.com (accessed from homepage
by entering title into CNN/Money search engine) (last visited Feb. 6, 2003) ("U.S. stocks
closed out a highly volatile week sharply lower Friday [August 2, 2002], although off their
worst levels, on a weak employment report, a profit warning from Walt Disney, and a
Goldman Sachs prediction that the Federal Reserve will be forced to cut interest rates by the
end of the year."). But see Barbara Hagenbaugh, Uncertainty Slows March to Recovery,
USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 2002, at I B ("Recent data have shown the economy slowed
dramatically in September and October [2002]. The number of jobs in the nation shrank;
consumers cut spending, especially on cars; and wary CEOs scrapped plans to buy
equipment. Early signs suggest things won't pick up in November or December [2002].").
See supra notes 4, 8, 56.
321. See supra notes 312-13; see also supra notes 4, 8, 56.
322. See also Elizabeth Bun-filler, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations,
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2002, at Cl. Bumiller reports:
[i]n a sign of how profoundly the nation's business scandals and volatile stock
market have rocked his administration, President Bush signed a sweeping
corporate-fraud bill today [Sarbanes-Oxley Act] with central provisions that he
opposed just three weeks ago. Even though he had objected to the provisions
earlier and had promoted his team's corporate experience in his presidential
campaign, Mr. Bush cast himself today as the protector of the small investor and
the rank-and-file worker. Vowing stiff punishment for corporate wrongdoers, Mr.
Bush bluntly threatened, "No more easy money for corporate criminals, just hard
time." He called the legislation "the most far-reaching reforms of American
business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt."
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a time when investor confidence has been battered,323 it would be a most
inopportune time to, in essence, deregulate the securities integration area. 4
/d.
323. See Bums, supra note 312 ("A wave of corporate scandals and the sinking stock
market have shaken Illinois residents' faith in big business, and only a handful think now
is a good time to invest."). Commentators are beginning to compare the market crash of the
Great Depression era to the 2002 stock market tumble and are stating that greater numbers
of people will suffer now than in the 1930s. See Janet Kidd Stewart, Anger Rises as Markets
Fall, CmII. TRIB., July 28, 2002, at 5-1. Stewart compares the two eras, writing:
And although their [1990s investors] pain hasn't reached the breadlines and
joblessness of the Depression era, in some respects it has cut deeper into society
than the 1929 stock market crash. Then,just 1.2 percent of the population invested
in stocks.... Today, after the historic bull market run-up of the 1990s, more than
half of American households own stocks, and nearly a third of their total net worth
is tied to the market.
Id.
324. Already, commentators are pointing out that the major corporate scandals being
played out currently are in industries that were deregulated by Congress in recent years, such
as telecommunications (WorldCom) and energy (Enron). See Jeanne Cummings et al., Bush
Crackdown On Business Fraud Signals New Era, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2002, at Al. In
giving a "tongue-lashing" to big business executives, President Bush marked a distinctive
swing from his election campaign of two years ago where he wooed many of those same
business executives by promising an administration that would scale back Washington's
interference in their affairs. Id.
But that effort has been hurt by the continuing stream of corporate scandals-and
thefact that the most notorious have exploded in sectors deregulated in the 1990s:
Enron Corp. and its competitors in electricity and energy trading and WorldCom
Inc., Global Crossing Ltd, and Qwest Communications International Inc. in
telecommunications.
Id. (emphasis added). The depth of the scandals in companies whose industries were
deregulated in the 1990s continues to amaze. Additional fraud charges were filed against
WorldCom in November 2002. Kurt Eichenwald & Seth Schiesel, S.E. C.Files New Charges
on WorldCom, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,2002, at C1 ("The Securities and Exchange Commission
filed additional fraud charges against WorldCom yesterday, saying that the company inflated
earnings by almost $2 billion more than it had previously disclosed in accounting
manipulations that begin in 1999, earlier than was originally charged." (emphasis added)).
"The WorldCom scandal has involved a series of expanding revelations about the practices
of a company that was once a Wall Street favorite and a symbol of the highflying
telecommunications business of the late 1990s." Id.; see generally Global Crossing Restates
Financials, CNN MONEY, Oct. 21,2002, available at http://money.cnn.com (accessed from
homepage by entering title into CNN/Money search engine) (last visited Feb. 6, 2003);
Qwest Restates $950 Million in Revenue, available at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline
/technology/apqwest_revenues.html (url no longer available) (on file with author).
Another example of corporate scandal in the deregulated energy industry is that of El
Paso Corp., a natural gas supplier that "illegally tightened natural gas supplies needed by
California during the state's energy crisis, contributing to a rise in power prices" as the
company "withheld extremely large amounts of capacity that could have flowed to its
California delivery points." El Paso Hurt Calif.: Judge CNN MONEY, Sept. 23, 2002,
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Under intense political and public scrutiny, the SEC can ill afford to
dissolve a doctrine that removes certain investor protections, despite the
dubious effectiveness of the application of the doctrine.
VI. A NEW INTEGRATION ANALYSIS
A. Proposed Reforms to the Integration Doctrine
In arguing that the integration doctrine is still a useful and important
regulatory tool, one must acknowledge that the doctrine's current
formulation and history are problematic and grueling. Nevertheless, a
simplified integration analysis could prove to be valuable and
comprehensible, if the proper protections inherent in the doctrine remain
intact. To that end, I propose the following integration doctrine test.
1. A New Safe Harbor
Because an integration safe harbor protects offerings from integration,
the current five-factor test does not apply to offerings protected by a safe
harbor.325 I propose that the SEC adopt a new rule where, similar to the
Rule 147 and Regulation D safe harbors, all multiple offerings of securities
that occur outside a six-month period be protected from integration.
Currently, only Rule 147, Regulation D and to an extent Regulation A
offerings are protected from integration if they occur either six months
before or six months after the Rule 147, Regulation D or Regulation A sale.
This new rule would create a safe harbor that would protect all offerings of
all securities classes from integration if they occur more than six months
before or after each other.
Under this new safe harbor, only offerings of securities that occur
within six months of each other would ever be confronted with integration
analysis. Any two or more offerings made within six months of each other
would automatically be analyzed under the integration standard, unless the
offerings fell within a separate safe harbor. Adopting a permanent six-
available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/09/23/news/companies/elpaso/index.htm (accessed
from homepage by entering title into CNN/money search engine) (last visited June 8, 2003)
("Energy company's shares continue to fall amid findings that it cut needed gas supplies..
.. El Paso's shares fell another 21 cents to $7.30 after-hours Monday following a 36 percent
tumble in the regular session, as investors scrambled to size up the company's liability for
potential fines or refunds.").
325. Bradford, An Economic Analysis, supra note 45, at 652.
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month safe harbor would introduce the first bright line rule to the
integration dilemma. A new starting point would be available to issuers and
issuers' counsel for specific integration analysis.
Under the current system, if two offerings are not protected by a
discrete safe harbor, proper integration analysis is confounding because no
bright lines exist and there is no starting point from which to begin
analysis. Only an ambiguous five-factor test is available, without guidelines
or specific directions on how to properly apply it.326 Under the new six-
month safe harbor, a definitive starting point is established: if the multiple
offerings are made more than six months apart, no integration analysis must
be conducted as the offerings are protected-if the multiple offerings are
made within six months of each other, integration analysis must be
conducted.
Admittedly, the six-month standard established by the SEC with regard
to several other safe harbors has been criticized as arbitrary. 27
Nevertheless, the agency established the six-month window presumably
because it felt that it represented a sufficient amount of time to safely
assume that a single offering had not been splintered inappropriately in
connection with Regulation D and Rule 147 offerings. My new safe harbor
proposal would perpetuate that accepted time period and assume that if six
months pass between offerings, then it is likely that the offerings were not
a single offering fragmented by an unscrupulous issuer seeking to avoid
registration.
Establishing a new six-month safe harbor would also effectively
neutralize one of the factors in the five-factor test, the "at or about the same
time" factor. 2 Essentially, adopting the six-month safe harbor for all
securities would by definition force the "at or about the same time" factor
to be defined as "within six months." All securities offerings by the same
issuer, occurring within six months of the last offering will be analyzed
under the integration doctrine, unless protected by a separate safe harbor.
Establishing a definite time standard will greatly facilitate clarification of
the needlessly complex integration doctrine.
Further, the SEC will promote goodwill with securities practitioners,
scholars and lawyers by removing one of the ambiguous rules that has hung
326. See supra Part III.A.
327. Deaktor, supra note 32, at 517 ("Whatever the merits to a policy promoting
compliance with rules 146 and 147, a case can be made for shortening the present six-month
measure of freedom from integration. In the first place, the length of time chosen is largely
arbitrary." (emphasis added)).
328. See supra Part III.A.3.
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over the capital markets for too long: the refusal to explain or define the
meaning of "at or about the same time," '329 forcing issuers to speculate
constantly about timing. By adopting this new safe harbor the SEC can
adopt a starting point that makes sense and with its adoption the integration
doctrine becomes far less murky.
2. A New Three-Factor Test
The new six-month safe harbor protects from integration all offerings
made more than six months before or six months after a second offering.330
Therefore, only simultaneous offerings originating within six months of
each other need be analyzed for integration purposes under a specific SEC
test. With the time element factor now eliminated from the five-factor test
by virtue of the new six-month inclusive safe harbor, the five-factor test
must be reconfigured if it is still to be used for integration analysis.
The least important, and by far the most ineffective factor is the "same
type of consideration" element.' Almost every offering receives cash as
consideration in exchange for the security.332 This factor is rarely analyzed
and in very few instances has the SEC examined multiple securities
offerings where different types of consideration were used.333 Because it is
an outdated and unnecessary element, I recommend that the "same type of
consideration" factor be completely eliminated from the integration
analysis.
Therefore, I propose a new three-factor test for all integration questions
regarding offerings that are not protected by the new six-month safe harbor.
The new three-factor test will be comprised of: (1) whether the same class
of securities is being offered in simultaneous (i.e., within six months)
offerings, (2) whether the simultaneous offerings are being made for the
same general purpose, and (3) whether the simultaneous offerings are part
of a single plan of financing.
Clearly, the new three-factor test adopts the remaining elements from
the original five-factor test after the "time" and "consideration" factors are
removed from the analysis.33 However, I will later propose how the test is
to be conducted in order to allow for maximum simplicity and clarity.
329. Wade, supra note 30, at 221-23.
330. See supra Part VI.A.1.
331. See supra Part II1.A.4.
332. Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 163, at 1242.
333. Id.
334. See supra Part III.A.
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a. Same Class of Securities
The first element to be considered in all future integration analyses
under the new three-factor test will be whether the multiple securities
offerings are of the same class of securities. The SEC must first clearly
define the "same class of security." '335 For integration purposes, that
definition will include four categories: common, preferred, unsecured debt
and secured debt. If the two offerings are the same class, then a strong
presumption is created that the offerings should be integrated. For example,
two offerings of common stock, initiated within six months of each other,
will be presumed to be splintered and in need of integration.
Conversely, if the two offerings are not the same class of security, then
a strong presumption will be created that the offerings should not be
integrated. Two offerings, initiated within six months of each other, where
one transaction involves common stock and the second transaction involves
secured debt, will be presumed to be two distinct offerings not in need of
integration.
Therefore, the most dynamic feature for integration consideration under
the new three-factor test is whether the securities being offered are of the
same class. This is so because what would otherwise be a single offering
that has been splintered into multiple offerings to avoid registration would
in most cases involve offerings of similar classes of securities.336 Thus, only
when multiple offerings involve securities of the same class will there be
a strong likelihood that the offerings will be integrated. Nevertheless, the
remaining two elements play an important role in rebutting the presumption
in favor of or against integration.
b. Same General Purpose
The second factor to be considered in all future integration analyses
under the new three-factor test will be whether the multiple simultaneous
securities offerings are intended to accomplish the same general purpose.
This question is answered by determining how the issuer intends to use the
proceeds of the offering. To accomplish a simple examination of this factor,
the SEC must first adopt a clear definition of the term "same general
purpose,"337 which for purposes of the new three-factor test will be whether
the issuer intends to use the proceeds to accomplish the same goals or ends.
335. See supra Part I11.A.2.
336. See generally JOHNSON & MCLAUGHIN, supra note 47, at 414-16.
337. See supra Part III.A.5.
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In order to show that the proceeds are not being used for the same
general purpose, an issuer must use the proceeds for very divergent
objectives. A strong showing of divergent purposes will consist of specific
plans for proceed usage and a showing that such proceeds will be used for
entirely different objectives. If, for example, proceeds from one offering are
to be used for financial purposes (i.e., raising capital, paying down high
interest debt) and the proceeds from the second offering are to be used for
non-financial purposes (i.e, construction costs, expansion), sufficiently
divergent purposes will be demonstrated.
Because of the natural overlap between the same general purpose factor
and the single plan of financing factor,338 these second and third factors in
the new three-factor test will be considered together. They will be analyzed
most intensely when the multiple offerings in question consists of the same
class of security. When simultaneous offerings do in fact involve the same
type of security, a presumption exists that the offerings will be integrated.
The only way to rebut this presumption is to show clearly and decisively
that the proceeds from the offerings are not to be used for the same general
purpose and that the simultaneous offerings are not based on a singular plan
of financing.
Clearly articulating the purposes for which the proceeds from the
offerings will be used, and demonstrating that the goals and objectives of
such usage are very different, will rebut the presumption that offerings of
the same class of securities will be integrated.
c. Single Plan of Financing
The third factor to be analyzed in all future integration analyses under
the new three-factor test will be whether the simultaneous securities
offerings are part of a single plan of financing. The SEC must first clearly
define a "single plan of financing."339 For purposes of the new three-factor
test a single plan of financing will be analyzed against the following three
factors: (1) the method through which an issuer offers the securities, (2) the
timing of the multiple offerings, and (3) whether the offerings are
financially interdependent.3"
In order to show that the offerings are not made pursuant to a single
plan of financing, an issuer must show that the methods of offering are
different, the timing for when the capital is needed with respect to each
338. Wade, supra note 30, at 213.
339. See supra Part III.A.1.
340. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 163, at 1235.
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offering is dissimilar and the offerings are not financially interdependent.
If an issuer is using different offering methods to initiate the securities
offerings and if the timing for when the capital is needed is sufficiently
dissimilar, this will constitute a satisfactory demonstration of contrasting
plans of financing.
Again, due to the natural overlap between the same general purpose
factor and this single plan of financing factor, the second and third factors
in the new three-factor test will be considered concurrently. When multiple
offerings do in fact contain the same type of security, a presumption exists
that the offerings will be integrated. This presumption can be defeated only
upon a solid showing that the multiple offerings are not part of a single plan
of financing and that the proceeds from the offerings will not to be used for
the same general purpose.
Plainly showing that the offerings are not part of a single plan of
financing will have the effect of rebutting the presumption that offerings of
the same class of securities will be integrated.
3. Properly Conducting the Three-Factor Test
The new test, to be efficient and effective, must be conducted as
follows:
First: The Six-Month Safe Harbor. The multiple offerings will be
examined and a determination made as to whether they fit within the new
six-month safe-harbor. If the multiple offerings are outside the six-month
window, they are protected from integration. If the offerings are within the
six-month window, they are not protected by the safe harbor and must be
examined for purposes of integration.
Second: The First Factor of the Three-Factor Test-Same Class of
Security. After determining that the multiple offerings are not protected by
the six-month safe harbor, they must be analyzed under the three-factor test
for integration. The first factor to be considered is whether the multiple
securities offerings are of the same class (i.e., common, preferred,
unsecured debt or secured debt). If the offerings do involve the same class
of securities, a strong presumption is created that the offerings will be
integrated. If the multiple offerings do not involve the same class of
security, a strong presumption is created that they will not be integrated.
If the simultaneous offerings do involve the same class of security, the
presumption that the offerings will be integrated can only be defeated
through a robust showing that the offerings are not being made for the same
general purpose and that the offerings are not part of a single plan of
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financing. If the multiple offerings involve different security classes, a
presumption exists that the offerings will not be integrated, and only upon
a weak showing that the offerings are not for the same general purpose, or
are not part of a single plan of financing, will the offerings be integrated.
Third: The Second and Third Factors of the Three-Factor Test-Same
General Purpose and Single Plan of Financing. If the multiple offerings of
securities involve the same class, an issuer must first show that they were
not made for the same general purpose. In order to show that the proceeds
are not being used for the same general purpose, an issuer must use the
proceeds for very divergent purposes. A strong proof of divergent purposes
will consist of specific plans for proceed usage and a strong showing that
such proceeds from the two offerings will be used for entirely different
objectives.
Further, to avoid integration and overcome the strong presumption in
favor of integration, the issuer must show that, interrelated with the same
general purpose factor, the offerings were not part of a single plan of
financing. In order to show that the offerings are not made pursuant to a
single plan of financing, an issuer must demonstrate that the methods of
offering are different, the timing for when the capital is needed is different
and the offerings are not financially interdependent.
Only upon a strong showing that the offerings are not for the same
general purpose and are not part of a single plan of financing will the
presumption in favor of integration be rebutted and the offerings will not
be integrated. Otherwise, if the proceeds are to be used for the same or
similar purposes and the offerings are not from significantly different plans
of financing, the offerings will be integrated.
On the other hand, if the multiple simultaneous offerings are not of the
same class of security, a strong presumption exists that they will not be
integrated. Only upon a feeble showing that they are not being made for the
same general purpose and are not part of a single plan of financing will the
offerings be integrated. If an issuer fails to establish divergent use of
proceeds and if the issuer cannot exhibit varying delivery methods or
deviating time for capital need, then the offering, albeit of different security
classes, will be integrated.
Therefore, if the offerings are not of the same class, but if the issuer
plans to use the proceeds for the same general purpose, and if the offerings
appear to be from the same plan of financing in that the same method of
delivery is used and the timing for raising the capital is the same, then even
though the securities are not of the same class, the offerings will be
integrated because they were being made for the same general purpose and
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from a single plan of financing. The presumption of non-integration will be
defeated.
Accordingly, this proposed three-factor integration test simplifies and
clarifies what has been a troubled sea of uncertainty for many years. 4 The
most important factors are left intact: timing (within six months), class of
security, and the dual same general purpose/single plan of financing
factors. As recommended above,342 the SEC should, through a release,
adopt the three-factor test and clearly define each of the factors and terms
as suggested above. With a new safe harbor and a well-defined three-factor
test, the integration conundrum can once and for all be resolved, thereby
keeping the goal of investor protection intact while creating no new
obstacles for capital formation.
B. The SEC Can Take a Major Step Toward Boosting Consumer
Confidence
It is a fact that in this troubled and volatile economic time, 43 with
capital markets deteriorating under the weight of accounting fraud,
financial restatement and executive management corruption, '3 the
341. See supra Part IlI.B.
342. See supra Part III.A. 1-5.
343. See supra notes 4, 56, 309, 312.
344. See supra notes 6, 8, 10, 15, 17, 312, 320, 323; see also Former Adelphia
Executives Arrestedfor Fraud, N.Y. TIMEs, July 24,2002, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/reuters/business/business-crime-adelphia.html (url no longer available). In yet another
example of corporate fraud and criminal activity by the management of a major U.S.
corporation, former executives of Adelphia Communications Corp. were arrested July 10,
2002:
Three members of the founding family of troubled cable operator Adelphia
Communications Corp. and two former executives were arrested on Wednesday
on federal securities and bank fraud charges.
The complaint, unsealed in Manhattan federal court, names as defendants
former Chief Executive John Rigas; former Chief Financial Officer Timothy
Rigas; Michael Rigas, former executive vice president, operations; James R.
Brown, former vice president, finance; and Michael Mulcahey....
The lengthy complaint alleges the defendants conspired to commit securities,
wire, and bank fraud. "The investigation has revealed probable cause to believe
that John J. Rigas ... together with members of his family has looted Adelphia
on a massive scale, using the company as the Rigas family's personal piggy bank
at the expense ofpublic investors and creditors," the complaint alleges.
The Rigas family members had resigned from Adelphia following the
disclosure of billions of dollars of off-balance-sheet loans guaranteed by the
company to the Rigas family, overstated earnings, and other accounting issues.
Id. (emphasis added). James R. Brown, Adelphia's former executive vice president, plead
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SEC and the U.S. capital markets have lost investor confidence.345 Further,
the SEC is losing its reputation as a competent protector of the financial
markets, as it is harshly criticized and attacked by both elected legislators
and the general public.346 The agency can no longer exist in a world of self-
guilty to bank fraud and other charges in November 2002 "as part of a [plea] deal to testify
against Rigas family members accused of plundering the now-bankrupt cable company." Ex-
Adeiphia Exec Pleads Guilty, CNN MONEY, Nov. 14, 2002, available at http://money
.cnn.com/2002/l 1/ 14/news/companies/adelphia/index.htm (accessed from the homepage by
entering title into CNN/Money search engine) (last visited Mar. 13, 2003) ("The former vice
president of finance at Adelphia Communications Corp. was the first person to plead guilty
in the scandal that authorities say cost investors more than $60 billion."). As it now seeks
bankruptcy protection due to Adelphia management malfeasance, the bankrupt cable
operator announced the appointment of a new chairman whom the company hopes will lead
it back to solvency and respectability as a viable corporate concern. Adelphia Names New
Chiefs, CNN MONEY, Jan. 17, 2003, available at http://money.cnn.com (accessed from
homepage by entering title into the CNN/Money search engine) (last visited Feb. 7, 2003)
("[B]ankrupt cable operator Adelphia Communications Corp .... named former AT&T
executive William Schleyer as its chairman and chief executive .... In addition, the company
said Ron Cooper, AT&T Broadband's chief operating officer, would be appointed with the
same title at Adelphia.").
On the heels of the Adelphia debacle, Merck & Co. announced that it too had
committed accounting fraud. Merck Accounting Murky, CNN MONEY, July 8, 2002,
available at http://money.cnn.com (accessed from homepage by entering title into the
CNN/Money search engine) (last visited Feb. 7, 2003) ("Merck & Co. shares tumbled
Monday [July 8, 2002] after a Securities and Exchange Commission filing by the company
revealed that more than $14 billion, or 10 percent, of revenue reported since 1999 was never
actually collected by the company.").
Further startling corruption came to light when the former chief executive of the
Sunbeam Corporation, Albert J. Dunlap, agreed to settle S.E.C. fraud claims against him for
$500,000 and acceptance of a condition that he be banned from ever serving as an officer
or director of a public company. Floyd Norris, Former Sunbeam ChiefAgrees to Ban and
a Fine of $500,000, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2002, at C- I (late ed.). When Dunlap was initially
hired at Sunbeam in 1996:
the company's share price leaped nearly 50 percent on the announcement, and it
rose further after the company reported a turnaround in 1997. Sunbeam's board
responded by agreeing to double Mr. Dunlap's base salary to $2 million a year.
But the S.E.C. later said that the turnaround was largely because of fraud.
The company restated profits and later filed for bankruptcy.
"This was a primer in the techniques of financial fraud in that they employed
such a wide variety of techniques to manage earnings," Thomas C. Newkirk, an
S.E.C. associate director of enforcement, said yesterday.
Id.
345. See supra note 323.
346. See supra notes 3, 9, 18; see also Labaton, S.E.C. Is Facing Deeper Trouble,
supra note 11. Labaton quoted Alan Bromberg, a law professor at Southern Methodist
University, for the suggestion that many of the recent problems facing the SEC have been
self-inflicted:
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imposed ambiguities. The time has come for the SEC to overhaul itself.
This era of reform should include, as a key priority, the reformation of the
integration doctrine.3 47 Now is the time for the SEC to update its antiquated
systems and mend the areas of the law that are in need of significant repair.
In an environment ripe for securities law reform, the priority should be to
end the legacy of ambiguity, confusion and exasperation that is the
securities integration doctrine.
Significantly repairing and reforming the securities reporting system
would be an important and historic step in winning back the confidence of
U.S. investors in the capital markets and in the disclosure system upon
which those markets are based. Further, once and for all resolving the
integration conundrum as recommended above would show that the SEC
is responsive to the concerns of securities practitioners and scholars and is
not deaf to the calls for reform from those who thoughtfully criticize
specific doctrines and actions by the SEC. Conducting such reforms now
would preserve the two important non-competing interests of restoring
consumer and investor confidence through investor protections and
simplifying the issuance process for issuers of securities.
Adopting the suggested reforms above will help to ameliorate the
criticisms lodged against the SEC as an unresponsive and arrogant agency.
Further, adopting these changes will accomplish the goal of moving the
general public into a position of regaining confidence in the U.S. capital
markets. Finally, by adopting the reforms outlined above, the SEC can end
the legacy of confusion, ambiguity and dissatisfaction that has tainted the
integration doctrine for over seventy years.34
An example might appropriately illustrate:
[T]he commission has lost its leadership in a whole bunch of vital areas.
It's partly because of Harvey Pitt, who came in promising to be friendlier to
the accountants ... It's partly because of this administration [under President
George W. Bush], which has been friendlier to big business. And it's partly
because the agency has been starved for money and resources.
Id. The Bush administration, no doubt hoping to stem the tide of SEC and administration
criticism, has turned to William Donaldson as its nominee for the next SEC chairperson in
wake of the resignation of Harvey Pitt. White House Sets SEC Nomination, CNN MONEY,
Jan. 23, 2003, available at http://money.cnn.com/2003/01/23/newslbushdonaldson.reut/
index.htm (accessed from homepage by entering title into CNN/Money search engine) (last
visited Mar. 13, 2003) ("The Bush administration expects to formally nominate Wall Street
banker William Donaldson early next week as the next chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission.").
347. See generally supra note 59.
348. See generally supra Part Ill.B.
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While working as a young associate at a major international
law firm in Chicago, Illinois, I was approached by a senior partner
in the corporate department who was also the securities law
subgroup leader and was assigned a project that dealt with what
was termed an "integration issue." A client of the firm had recently
decided to issue an offering of its common stock and we had begun
to prepare the appropriate form for purposes of filing it with the
SEC prior to offering and selling the proposed underwritten
offering. The client was intending to raise capital with the common
stock transaction in order to effectuate particular corporate
improvements within the company. While in the midst of preparing
the required forms, an opportunity arose for the company to
become involved in a distinct pooled transaction organized by a
major underwriter, wherein certain warrants would be purchased
by a number of participating banks.
The senior partner, confessing that she knew the "basics" when
it came to integration, needed me to dig into the details and
instructed me to hit the books and return in a day or two with a
definite answer as to whether the two proposed offerings would be
integrated for purposes of registration. I was told that the client
would be expecting a concrete answer from us as to whether it
could participate in the pooled vehicle without worrying that its
issuance of common stock would be tainted by the subsequent
issuance of warrants in the pooled transaction. Essentially, I
needed to determine whether the issuance of warrants would be
integrated into the offering of common stock.
I went directly to the books and identified a new safe harbor
and three-factor integration analysis. I was able to quickly and
easily determine that our client did not come within the six-month
safe harbor based on the fact that it was registering its offering of
common stock and was hoping to participate in the pooled vehicle
within the same month.
In recognizing that no safe harbors protected the offering from
integration, I learned that a three-factor test must be used to
analyze simultaneous securities offerings. First, I needed to
determine whether the classes of securities being offered were the
same. If yes, then a presumption of integration would be present.
If no, then a presumption of non-integration would exist. Because
one of the securities was common stock and the warrants were for
secured debt, the classes of securities were not the same and our
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client was rewarded with a presumption against integration.
Next, I analyzed whether the offerings were being made for the
same general purpose and with a single plan of financing. I needed
only to make a credible showing that they were not for the same
general purpose and were not through a single plan of financing,
based on the classes of securities being different, and was able to
easily meet that burden by quickly determining that the proceeds
were to be used for different purposes (to make corporate
improvements in one and to repay higher interest debt with the
other). Because the classes of securities were different and
because, upon cursory examination, the use of proceeds were going
to be different, I was able to seamlessly determine that the client
could participate in the pooled vehicle with no fear whatsoever of
integration.
I delivered this news to the senior partner and was able to tell
the client confidently, in a conference call, that they had nothing
to fear on the integration front. The senior partner and I had greater
confidence in the SEC and its rulemaking authority based on the
new test and the helpful explanations and definitions that
accompanied it. The client had greater confidence in its ability to
raise needed capital. 49
VII. CONCLUSION
Recent corporate malfeasance has led to intense scrutiny of the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the securities laws. As the U.S.
capital markets falter under the weight of accounting scandal, executive
misdeeds and outright management fraud, investors in the U.S. markets
stand by in stunned disbelief as retirement funds, college education
accounts and life savings fade away. Recent events have presented a
challenge to the SEC never before encountered, and all eyes are on the
agency charged with regulating the U.S. markets and protecting the
investors that invest in those markets. The environment is ripe for corporate
reform and the SEC must act correctly and quickly to spare its reputation
by finding and punishing corporate wrongdoers.
One area in which the SEC could provide positive, timely and vitally
needed corporate reform is the integration doctrine. This long-criticized
doctrine, challenged consistently as being ambiguous, inconsistent,
349. See supra note 65 and accompanying narrative.
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confusing and even useless, can be resurrected with ease and distinction.
Abolishing the doctrine is not politically sound, nor will it replace the
investor protection element badly needed at this time. Repairing the
integration doctrine would address long held concerns regarding its
usefulness. Simplifying the doctrine would show that the SEC is responsive
to scholarly criticism and is open to explaining the reasons why it acts as
it does. Rescuing the doctrine from its haze of confusion and
misapplication would be politically savvy as a reform move meant to
strengthen investor protections.
The SEC, in an official release, should adopt the new six-month safe
harbor and new three-factor test as enunciated above. The safe harbor is
simple and the test is easily conducted and interpreted. Adoption of the safe
harbor and new three-factor test would accomplish the objectives of the
1933 Securities Act by providing protection to investors through requiring
full and fair disclosure of certain securities that do not fall within discrete
exemptions. Issuers would be delighted to have a coherent, easily applied
test by which to measure its multiple offerings of securities. Securities
lawyers would be eager to answer integration questions raised by issuers
because a logical examination would be in place to analyze the offerings.
The general public would receive some sense of satisfaction from knowing
that the SEC is becoming more expressive and accessible to market
difficulties. Finally, the SEC would be perceived as a greater investor
protector and as a responsive and critical governmental agency.
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